A/HRC/16/52 productive to law-enforcement efforts. He hopes, in this context, to join many others who wish to counter this worrying trend towards a severe erosion of some of the gains of the last four decades. 51. Under the rubric of fighting the war on terror, confronting organized crime and insecurity in the streets or maintaining an effective immigration policy, States have, regrettably, attempted to dilute cardinal principles necessary to preventing and suppressing torture and ill-treatment. Of particular concern are attempts to justify restrictions or limitations to the applicability of article 15 of the Convention, citing, as primary arguments, a supposed “necessity to avert serious imminent harm” or the “ticking bomb scenario” or, where the State is not complicit in the torture, that information provided by third parties, even if obtained under torture, is admissible. 52. The Special Rapporteur recalls that international customary law and treaty law require States to “ensure that any statement which is established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made.”6 This exclusionary rule is fundamental for upholding the absolute and non-derogable nature of the prohibition of torture by providing a disincentive to use torture. Its essential preventive function is also crucial to fair trial guarantees. The Special Rapporteur calls for strict adherence to the international prohibitions established under international treaties and developed through the Convention, as well as regional and national judicial processes. 53. Attempts to restrict the applicability of the exclusionary rule represent a serious threat to international efforts to eradicate torture. It is of deep concern that States regularly receive and rely on information – either as intelligence or evidence for proceedings – whose sources present a real risk of having been acquired as a result of torture and ill-treatment from third party States. Receiving or relying on information from third parties which may be compromised by the use of torture does not only implicitly validate the use of torture and ill-treatment as an acceptable tool to gain information, but creates a market for information acquired through torture, which in the long term undermines the goal of preventing and eradicating torture. 54. While article 15 of the Convention covers judicial and administrative proceedings, it is silent on the question of the applicability of its provisions to intelligence or other executive decisions not directly arising from judicial or administrative proceedings. This is rendered more troublesome by difficulties in delineating purely “non-formal preventative” action by executive decisions arising from formal administrative proceedings. For instance, a State may rely on information provided by a third party, and which may have been obtained through torture, to arrest and detain an individual for the purpose of investigating his alleged suspicious activities. In such a case, aspects of administrative proceedings such as a deportation order may be used in the process of arresting the suspect. Thus, by virtue of article 15, it is argued that State institutions must take appropriate measures to ascertain whether or not the information on which a decision is based has been obtained as a result of torture. However, does the fact that the information was obtained through torture prevent the State from arresting the individual in the first place? Can it be used as intelligence or as the subject of an executive decision? Are diplomatic assurances relating to the origins of the information provided by third parties sufficient? We should be mindful of the real possibility that a policy of using such information for purposes other than trials, could provide an incentive to State agents to forego prosecutions altogether, and instead engage in 6 12 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, article 15.