A/HRC/23/40 Review has also included recommendations to ensure, for example, that legislation relating to the Internet and other new communication technologies respects international human rights obligations.20 V. Modalities of communications surveillance 33. Modern surveillance technologies and arrangements that enable States to intrude into an individual’s private life threaten to blur the divide between the private and the public spheres. They facilitate invasive and arbitrary monitoring of individuals, who may not be able to even know they have been subjected to such surveillance, let alone challenge it. Technological advancements mean that the State’s effectiveness in conducting surveillance is no longer limited by scale or duration. Declining costs of technology and data storage have eradicated financial or practical disincentives to conducting surveillance. As such, the State now has a greater capability to conduct simultaneous, invasive, targeted and broad-scale surveillance than ever before. A. Targeted communications surveillance 34. States have access to a number of different techniques and technologies to conduct communications surveillance of a targeted individual’s private communications. Real-time interception capabilities allow States to listen to and record the phone calls of any individual using a fixed line or mobile telephone, through the use of interception capabilities for State surveillance that all communications networks are required to build into their systems.21 An individual’s location can be ascertained, and their text messages read and recorded. By placing a tap on an Internet cable relating to a certain location or person, State authorities can also monitor an individual’s online activity, including the websites he or she visits. 35. Access to the stored content of an individual’s e-mails and messages, in addition to other related communications data, can be obtained through Internet companies and service providers. The initiative of the European standards-setting authority, the European Telecommunications Standards Institute, to compel cloud providers22 to build “lawful interception capabilities” into cloud technology to enable State authorities to have direct access to content stored by these providers, including e-mails, messages and voicemails, raises concerns.23 36. States can track the movements of specific mobile phones, identify all individuals with a mobile phone within a designated area, and intercept calls and text messages, through various methods. Some States use off-the-air mobile monitoring devices called International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) catchers, which can be installed in a location temporarily (such as at a protest or march) or permanently (such as at an airport or other border crossings). These catchers imitate a mobile phone tower by sending and 20 21 22 23 10 A/HRC/14/10. See, for example, the United States Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act 1994 (United States); Telecommunications Act 1997, Part 15 (Australia); Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, ss12-14 (United Kingdom); Telecommunications (Interception Capability) Act 2004. A cloud provider offers services of networked online storage of data. ETSI DTR 101 567 VO.0.5 (2012-14), Draft Technical Report: Lawful Interception (LI); Cloud/Virtual Services (CLI).