A/HRC/23/40 of media. In some States, “cyber police forces” are tasked with inspecting and controlling the Internet, searching websites and critical nodes within websites (particularly online discussion forums) with a view to block or shut down websites whenever they contain content the Government disapproves of, including or criticism of the country’s leadership. The burden of such policing is transferred to private intermediaries, such as search engines and social network platforms, through laws that widen liability for proscribed content from the original speaker to all intermediaries. E. Restrictions on anonymity 47. One of the most important advances facilitated by the advent of the Internet was the ability to anonymously access and impart information, and to communicate securely without having to be identified. Initially, this was possible given that there was no “identity layer” to the Internet; originally, it was not possible to know who was behind a specific communication, e-mail address, or even a given computer. However, in the name of security and law enforcement, gradually States have been eradicating the opportunities for anonymous communication. In many States, individuals must identify themselves at cybercafés and have their transactions on public computers recorded. Increasingly, identification and registration are also required when buying a SIM card or mobile telephone device, for visiting certain major websites, or for making comments on media sites or blogs. 48. Restrictions on anonymity facilitate State communications surveillance by simplifying the identification of individuals accessing or disseminating prohibited content, making such individuals more vulnerable to other forms of State surveillance. 49. In this sense, restrictions on anonymity have a chilling effect, dissuading the free expression of information and ideas. They can also result in individuals’ de facto exclusion from vital social spheres, undermining their rights to expression and information, and exacerbating social inequalities. Furthermore, restrictions on anonymity allow for the collection and compilation of large amounts of data by the private sector, placing a significant burden and responsibility on corporate actors to protect the privacy and security of such data. VI. Concerns on national legal standards 50. Generally, legislation has not kept pace with the changes in technology. In most States, legal standards are either non-existent or inadequate to deal with the modern communications surveillance environment. As a result, States are increasingly seeking to justify the use of new technologies within the ambits of old legal frameworks, without recognizing that the expanded capabilities they now possess go far beyond what such frameworks envisaged. In many countries, this means that vague and broadly conceived legal provisions are being invoked to legitimize and sanction the use of seriously intrusive techniques. Without explicit laws authorizing such technologies and techniques, and defining the scope of their use, individuals are not able to foresee – or even know about – their application. At the same time, laws are being adopted to broaden the breadth of national security exceptions, providing for the legitimization of intrusive surveillance techniques without oversight or independent review. 51. Inadequate legal standards increase the risk of individuals being exposed to violation of their human rights, including the right to privacy and the right to freedom of expression. They also have an adverse impact on certain groups of individuals – for example, members of certain political parties, trade unionists or national, ethnic and linguistic minorities – who 13