A/HRC/13/37 19. In the view of the Special Rapporteur, the Human Rights Committee should draw up and adopt a new general comment on article 17, replacing current general comment No. 16 (1988). The existing general comment is very brief and does not reflect the bulk of the Committee’s practice that has emerged during the more than 20 years since its adoption. Nevertheless, many of the elements for a proper limitations clause, presented above in the light of the subsequent general comment No. 27, were already present in 1988.21 In its subsequent case law under the Optional Protocol, the Committee has emphasized that interference with the rights guaranteed in article 17 must cumulatively meet several conditions, i.e., it must be provided for by law, be in accordance with the provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant, and be reasonable in the particular circumstances of the case.22 Further, in finding violations of article 17, the Committee has applied the requirements of legitimate aim, necessity and proportionality.23 C. Erosion of the right to privacy by counter-terrorism policies 20. When considering current counter-terrorism policies, States often contend that there are two new dynamics that must be considered alongside privacy protection. First, States claim that their ability to prevent and investigate terrorist acts is linked intimately with increased surveillance powers. The majority of counter-terrorism legislation activities since the events of 11 September 2001 have therefore focused on expanding Governments’ powers to conduct surveillance. Second, States claim that since terrorism is a global activity, the search for terrorists must also take place beyond national borders, with the help of third parties which potentially hold extensive amounts of information on individuals, generating a rich resource for identifying and monitoring terrorist suspects. States that previously lacked constitutional or statutory safeguards have been able to radically transform their surveillance powers with few restrictions. In countries that have constitutional and legal safeguards, Governments have endangered the protection of the right to privacy by not extending these safeguards to their cooperation with third countries and private actors, or by placing surveillance systems beyond the jurisdiction of their constitutions. 1. Increasing surveillance measures 21. The range of surveillance operations runs from the specific to the general. At the specific level, legal systems are capable of authorizing and overseeing: undercover operations and covert surveillance to identify illegal conduct; the accumulation of intelligence on specific individuals to identify breaches of law; and targeted surveillance of individuals to build a legal case. The Special Rapporteur had earlier specified that States may make use of targeted surveillance measures, provided that it is case-specific interference, on the basis of a warrant issued by a judge on showing of probable cause or reasonable grounds. There must be some factual basis, related to the behaviour of an individual, which justifies the suspicion that he or she may be engaged in preparing a terrorist attack.24 Worldwide, there has been a rise in communications surveillance through the interception of communications by intelligence and law enforcement agencies. There is a remarkable convergence in the types of policies pursued to enhance surveillance powers 21 22 23 24 GE.09-17804 See Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 16 (1988). See, in particular, paragraphs 3 and 4 that elaborate upon the notions of arbitrary and unlawful interference in ICCPR, art. 17. See Van Hulst v. The Netherlands, communication No. 903/1999, 2004. See Madafferi v. Australia, communication No. 1011/2001, 2004, and M.G. v. Germany, communication No. 1482/2006, 2008. A/HRC/10/3, para. 30. 9