A/HRC/2/7 page 29 26 Ibid., pp. 32-34 (Rule 9). 27 Ibid., p. 37 (Rule 11). 28 Ibid., pp. 40-43 (Rule 12). 29 Ibid., pp. 43-45 (Rule 13). 30 Ibid., p. 48 (Rule 14). 31 Ibid., p. 51 (Rule 15). 32 Ibid., pp. 51-67 (Rules 15-21). 33 Ibid., pp. 62-65 (Rule 20). 34 Ibid., pp. 337-340 (Rule 97). 35 Ibid., p. 340 (Rule 97). 36 Ibid., pp. 68-76 (Rules 22-24). 37 See also the recommendation contained in para. 107 below. 38 Ibid., pp. 568-603, 607-611 (Rules 156 and 158); see also E/CN.4/2006/53, paras. 33-43. 39 Some of the issues described in the section below are visually depicted in the situation map provided by UNOSAT (annex). 40 The total number of 15,500 sorties includes 1,200 transport missions, over 1,300 reconnaissance missions, and 1,000 combat search-and-rescue missions. It is unknown how many of the 15,000 sorties actually involved delivery of ordnance. 41 At the end of the second week (30 July), IDF said that its artillery batteries had fired more than 25,000 shells into south Lebanon. IDF also said that the army had carried out broad artillery attacks against rocket launching sites, against “squads of Hezbollah terrorists”, and structures and “strongholds” along the border. 42 As the Government of Lebanon has stated: “Israel has largely avoided some types of targets: major power plants, water treatment facilities, telephone systems, central government buildings and most factories. The bombing has focused on Shiite areas of southern Lebanon and the Beirut suburbs”. Government of Lebanon, “Setting the stage for long-term reconstruction: The national early recovery process”, Stockholm Conference for Lebanon's Early Recovery, 31 August 2006. 43 ICRC Study, see note 21 above, Rule 20.