A/HRC/2/7 page 10 While the mission found some aspects of the warnings to be highly problematic (see para. 66 below), they certainly saved many lives, both in south Beirut and south of the Litani river. 37. But despite Israel’s stated goal of conducting hostilities within the parameters set by international humanitarian law,44 the actual practice fell short in various respects, including: • A refusal to consistently distinguish Hezbollah fighters from civilians, including civilian members of Hezbollah (see paras. 38-48 below); • An approach to vetting targets that appears to have treated entire categories of dual-use objects as legitimate military objectives (see paras. 49-51 below); and • The reckless, perhaps even deliberately reckless, use of cluster munitions (see paras. 52-57 below). 2. Attacks on Hezbollah and the principle of distinction 38. One well-informed analysis of Israel’s targeting policies concluded that they were premised upon the permissibility of targeting the whole of Hezbollah’s infrastructure: “Targets belonging to the Hezbollah infrastructure which support the terrorist-operative apparatus in the Shi’ite neighborhoods of south Beirut (e.g., Dahiya) and other locations in Lebanon [are]: headquarters, offices, buildings serving Hezbollah’s various branches, leaders’ residences and the bunkers they are hiding in, as well as the organization’s ‘information’ infrastructure (Al-Manar TV) and offices of the organization’s social and financial infrastructure.”45 39. Such an enumeration of permissible targets is inconsistent with the principle of distinction. 40. While Hezbollah was in conflict with Israel, it does not follow that every member of Hezbollah could be justifiably targeted. Individuals do not become legitimate military objectives unless they are combatants or civilians directly participating in hostilities. Many members and supporters of Hezbollah do not meet either criterion. Similarly, not every building owned by or associated with Hezbollah constituted a legitimate military objective. Hezbollah is, in addition to being an organization using violence, a political movement and social services enterprise, particularly in the Dahiye and the areas of southern Lebanon with a Shiite majority population. It runs medical facilities, schools, groceries, an orphanage, a garbage service and a reconstruction programme for homes damaged during Israel’s invasion. It is the country's second-largest employer,46 holds 14 seats in parliament and, since 2005, is part of the Government. 41. Various Israeli targeting decisions operationalized this failure to distinguish military from civilian objectives. For example, some of the warnings stated that, “[a]ny vehicle of any kind travelling south of the Litani River will be bombarded, on suspicion of transporting rockets, military equipment and terrorists”.47 Israel’s responsibility to distinguish between combatants and civilians is in no way discharged by warning civilians that they will be targeted. Warnings are required for the benefit of civilians, but civilians are not obligated to comply with them. A