A/HRC/2/7 page 32 61 However, once a transportation artery has been severed, future attacks on that artery will provide, at the most, severely diminished military advantage. The only area in which a more general degradation of the transportation infrastructure could plausibly have been legitimate is in the area of ground confrontation between Israeli and Hezbollah forces. 62 http://www.maccsl.org/reports/Leb%20UXO%20Fact%20Sheet%2023%20September %202006.pdf. According to a map prepared by UNMACC of the 482 sites, cluster bomb use was concentrated in two bands away from the border area: from southeast of Rashidiyah on the coast (south of Tyre) to the northeast of Tyre; with a second band from southwest of Brashit and south of Tibnin extending northwards through Qabrikha into the Bekka valley to the west of Marjayoun. The only significant uses in the border zone were in the Yarun area south of Bint Jbeil and opposite (west of) the Israeli town of Metula. 63 One of the Rapporteurs visited Tibnine Governmental Hospital. During the conflict, this hospital provided medical services, shelter for 1,800 IDPs, and support (e.g. food) for over 10,000 transiting IDPs. The Rapporteur was informed that, in the last days of the conflict, between 50-100 cluster bomb sub-munitions hit the hospital and fell in the hospital grounds or the immediate vicinity; some exploded, some did not. Two unexploded bomblets hung in trees within the hospital grounds. One exploded within three or four metres of the door to the emergency clinic. A hospital fuel tank was hit (it did not explode) and windows broken. Installed on the roof, the systems for air conditioning and lifts were hit and malfunctioned. More than ten cars, parked within a few metres of the hospital, were hit and burnt, blackening the hospital’s wall. The hospital’s occupants were sheltering in an underground floor at the relevant times and none was injured. UNMACC has now cleared the hospital and its immediate environs of unexploded ordinances. 64 On the question of the adequacy of the provision of maps by Israel, see the conclusions addressed to the Government of Israel below. 65 ICRC Study, see note 21 above, p. 340. 66 Ibid., pp. 568-603 (Rule 156). 67 OCHA, Situation Report - Lebanon response, No. 23, 15 August 2006. 68 Jihad al-Bina, the Hezbollah construction arm which has carried out extensive damage assessment on the ground, estimates that 5,000 housing units were completely destroyed in Dhahiya, with 17,000 having endured some level of damage. They further estimte that presently 14,000 families are without homes in Dhahiya, equaling over 60,000 persons. (Based on local demographic realities, the quantification method applies a multiplication factor of 4.7 for family units to arrive at a total population figure. Thus, 14,000 families would approximate 65,800 persons.) Rapid Preliminary Damage Assessment, see note 52 above, p. 11, http://www.lebanonundersiege.gov.lb/Documents/rapidpreliminarydamageassessment.pdf, refers to 195 residential buildings “collapsed or destroyed” in all of Beirut, of which 144 are located in the cadastral limit Haret Horaik, the most impacted area of the Dahiye (132 of thesebuildings