A/HRC/41/54/Add.4 is clear that all force used by the police – including restraint - must be necessary, proportionate and reasonable in the circumstances. 52. Information previously released by the Home Office in response to a Freedom of Information request, there have been 23 deaths, in Immigration Removal Centres (IRC) or whilst under escort, between 1991 and 2014. Only one of those deaths was found to have been due to the use of restraint by Detainee Custody Officers. 53. As part of the UK Government’s commitment to increase transparency around immigration detention, we are reviewing the publication of immigration detention data. This includes data relating to deaths in immigration detention. This data was published for the first time in the Government’s November 2018 online statistics release and, moving forward, will be published annually. 54. Deaths in immigration detention are a relatively rare occurrence and form only a very small proportion of the detention estate throughput, which is around 24,000 people detained per year solely under immigration powers. All deaths in immigration detention are independently investigated. Every death in immigration detention is subject to investigation (where appropriate) by the police, the coroner (or Procurator Fiscal in Scotland) and the independent Prisons and Probation Ombudsman (PPO). Any recommendations made as a result of these investigations are thoroughly examined to see how they can be used to help prevent further deaths. Fatal incident investigation reports are published on the PPO website. 55. Para 43: The reference to “2011 report by the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) on deaths in custody is incorrect. The report was by the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC), which was reformed and renamed as the IOPC in January 2018. E. Racial Impact of Counterterrorism and Counter extremism Law and Policy Prevent Strategy 56. Para 47-51: The Government rejects much of the characterisation portrayed in Section C of the report, particularly that in response to recent terrorist attacks ‘leading politicians’ have portrayed Muslims as ‘inherently dangerous, inherently opposed to Britain’s prosperity, and inherently foreign’. The report cites no evidence for this. It is also particularly disappointing that the report states misinterpretations about the Prevent Strategy, which it inaccurately seeks to represent as having been directly drawn from Government publications. The report states in a number of instances that Prevent ‘disproportionately’ targets Muslims without providing any evidence of disproportionality, and without making any examination of the nature of the terrorist threat to the UK which the Prevent Strategy seeks to counter. Indeed, the report makes no mention that the Prevent Strategy addresses all forms of terrorism, including right wing terrorism, or that figures from 2017/18 show that those receiving support from the Channel programme (part of Prevent, which provides voluntary, confidential support to those who are vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism) were just as likely to be inspired by right wing extremism as Islamist extremism. 57. Referral figures into Prevent also demonstrate that the report’s characterisation that Prevent has ‘transformed public institutions such as hospitals, schools, universities, and even police’ is extremely misleading: by way of example, despite the NHS dealing with over 1m people every 36 hours, just 464 people were referred to Prevent by the health sector in the year 2017/18. The report repeats myths that Prevent forces frontline workers to report people and does not mention that the crucial fact that Prevent is a non-criminal, supportive programme, and that the ‘life-altering judgments’ which it refers to exist to support vulnerable people away from the influence of terrorist recruiters, and have an overwhelmingly positive effect. The Government announced in January 2019 that it would create an independent review of Prevent, which will report back to Parliament before August 2020. 58. National Security is reserved to the UK Government. Whilst delivery of the Prevent Strategy in Scotland shares the same strategic objectives as the rest of the UK, it also reflects 11