A/HRC/45/27 Republic, the national legislation does not adequately incorporate international crimes, in practice preventing their prosecution as such and the imposition of commensurate sanctions on perpetrators. Of further concern is the fact that conflict-related sexual violence committed in the context of terrorism is rarely prosecuted, despite the Security Council resolutions acknowledging sexual violence as a crime of terrorism and calling on States for it to be investigated and prosecuted.58 33. In some countries, that state of affairs is exacerbated by the development of amnesty agreements, often in ill-defined terms, for former fighters or persons associated with terrorist groups, which fail to conform to international law and standards. Vague agreements have resulted in some cases in concerned individuals being unable to make informed decisions about collaboration with the authorities, as the consequences could vary between amnesty and prosecution under legislation carrying harsh penalties. While amnesties may be permissible under international law under certain conditions, some crimes, in particular, genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and gross violations of human rights, may never be subject to amnesty.59 Failing to explicitly exclude such conduct from amnesty agreements or implementing legislation would violate the obligations of the State to bring perpetrators to justice and to ensure that victims of such violations have an effective remedy.60 34. In Somalia, for example, a lack of transparency regarding suspects’ screening processes and the lack of clarity surrounding eligibility for amnesty has meant that amnesty could be granted on an ad hoc basis, and that potential defectors from Al-Shabaab risk their lives twice: firstly, to escape Al-Shabaab, and secondly, because they might be considered a high risk and thus subjected to military justice processes. Somali women and civil society representatives have expressed fierce opposition to broad amnesties for international crimes, which are not permissible under international law. 61 In Nigeria, the Government embarked on broad amnesty-based negotiations with Boko Haram that would not result in the prosecution of some of the most egregious perpetrators of human rights violations. Many Nigerians opposed that policy, as it neither addressed criminal acts nor contributed to ending the cycle of violence. In Iraq, by contrast, pursuant to amendments made in November 2017 to the General Amnesty Law, No. 27/2016, terrorist suspects are ineligible for amnesties, regardless of the significance of the crimes of which they are accused. 35. Sweeping implementation of counter-terrorism legislation is resulting in high incarceration rates of pretrial detainees and persons sentenced for terrorism-related offences. Such overreach also feeds agendas of violent extremism. Core adherents of terrorist groups are frequently imprisoned with low-level members, and even sometimes with alleged victims of acts of terrorism presumed to be associated with terrorist groups, in substandard conditions. 4. Prosecution of suspected foreign fighters 36. The phenomenon of foreign fighters and States’ efforts to ensure individual perpetrators’ accountability for their acts raise distinct issues. A specific group of suspected foreign fighters has attracted international attention over the past few years, namely foreigners who joined terrorist groups in Iraq or the Syrian Arab Republic, many of whom are now held by the de facto authorities in the north-east of the Syrian Arab Republic. It is estimated that some 11,000 former Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant fighters are held in prisons in the Syrian Arab Republic by the de facto authorities, 2,000 or more of whom are foreign fighters from about 60 different nations. 62 In addition, an estimated 12,000 58 59 60 61 62 10 For example, S/2020/487, para. 15; and S/2018/250, paras. 20 and 45–46. OHCHR, Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Amnesties (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.09.XIV.1). International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2. See also Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant. UNU and Institute for Integrated Transitions, The Limits of Punishment, p. 136. See, e.g. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Al%20Hol%20 Snapshot_26Jul2020.pdf; www.unicef.org/press-releases/governments-should-repatriate-foreign-