A/HRC/16/50
prevent disclosure of information in the context of criminal trials, the use of secret
information as evidence, and the use of anonymous witnesses too often have resulted in a
lack of justice for victims of terrorism (for instance where problems associated with
intelligence-related evidence result in the dismissal of judicial proceedings against
individuals suspected of involvement in terrorist activity), denial of the right to a fair trial
for individuals accused of terrorist activity (for instance in cases where a civil proceeding,
investigation and/or prosecution is halted on grounds of State secrecy) or both.
35.
While the legitimate use of a State secrets privilege – as in cases where it is invoked
to exclude specific evidence, the exposure of which would necessarily harm national
security – can be critical to considerations of national security, its overly broad application
by some States has resulted in a lack of accountability including for serious human rights
violations.21 Non-disclosure of information and evidence deemed prejudicial to security
interests has hampered investigations and prosecutions in relation to the alleged complicity
of a number of States in the practice of renditions, for instance. The European Parliament
has emphasized the need for accountability in this regard, deeming it necessary to “review
by limiting and restrictively defining the exceptions that flow from the notion of ‘State
secret’ […] to avoid abuses and deviations that […] contradict human rights obligations”
and “establish specific mechanisms to allow for access to secret information by parliaments
and judges, as well as for the release of the information after a certain period of time”.22
36.
Following on the reports of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights on
secret detentions and illegal transfers of detainees, the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe has called for the elaboration of guidelines on human rights and the fight
against impunity which would “stress that state secrecy and immunities do not prevent
effective, independent and impartial investigations into serious human rights violations […]
and that those responsible should be held to account”.23 The forthcoming Committee report
on “Abuse of state secrecy and national security: obstacles to parliamentary and judicial
scrutiny of human rights violations” will be an important further step. While some action
has been taken by individual Member States of the Council of Europe in follow-up to the
recommendations flowing from these investigations, a great deal more is needed in order to
combat impunity and ensure accountability, including through investigations and
prosecutions at national levels.
37.
Serious concerns have been raised in the course of legal proceedings regarding the
broad use of State secrecy in several countries.24 For instance, in October 2009 the
21
22
23
24
The Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
while countering terrorism also has raised concerns over the increasing use of State-secrecy provisions
and public interest immunities by certain States, including Germany, Italy, Poland, Romania, the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the United Kingdom or the United States “to conceal illegal
acts from oversight bodies or judicial authorities, or to protect itself from criticism, embarrassment
and – most importantly – liability” (A/HRC/10/3, para. 59).
European Parliament resolution on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the
transportation and illegal detention of prisoners (2006/2200(INI)) of 14 February 2007, para. 194, and
in particular paras. 202 – 206 on secret services. See also European Parliament resolutions
2006/2027(INI) of 6 July 2006 and 2008/2179(INI) of 19 February 2009. The Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe has also recognized the problems caused by the invocation of
State secrecy, and has called on Council of Europe Member State governments to make available to
their national parliaments all relevant information held by them on the State’s role in renditions and
secret detentions (Parliamentary Assembly resolution 1562, para. 18.1.2).
Recommendation 1876 (2009), para. 2.2.
See for example El Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2005) (No. 1:05cv1417); aff’d, 479
F. 3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007). Applications are pending before the European Court of Human Rights
against the Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for its role in the
13
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