A/HRC/16/79 V. Conclusions and recommendations A. Conclusions 45. Following a relatively peaceful first round, the run-off of the 2010 presidential election in Côte d’Ivoire, held on 28 November 2010, was marked by a drastic deterioration in the human rights situation. At least 275 people have been killed since mid-December. Acts of intimidation, harassment and other infringements of the rights to life, physical integrity, safety and security, and property were committed by supporters of political parties, in particular by LMP supporters. Members of the defence and security forces loyal to Mr. Gbagbo used excessive and deadly force to repress political opponents, thus progressively driving the country into political turmoil and installing a climate of suspicion, fear and repression. Reports of the recruitment and arming of youths, the forced recruitment of other people to be used as human shields in the event of war, and the reactivation and rearmament of various militia groups indicate a strong possibility that the human rights situation in Côte d’Ivoire will worsen, despite the mediation efforts made by the international community, the African Union and ECOWAS to put an end to the crisis. 46. The prevailing political stalemate and the prospect of military intervention by ECOWAS with a view to installing the legitimate president-elect in power and the possible resumption of civil war in the country pose a real threat to the protection of civilians. The Security Council, in its resolution 1894 (2009) on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts, gave UNOCI a protection of civilians mandate, as outlined in Council resolution 1933 (2010), consisting in the protection, without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the Ivorian authorities, of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within the capabilities of UNOCI and its areas of deployment. In compliance with that resolution, UNOCI has drafted and adopted a comprehensive protection of civilians strategy that draws lessons from the shortcomings observed during the violent incidents of February 2010. A task force led by the Chief of the Human Rights Division was formed to draft and oversee the implementation of the strategy at both the national and subregional levels. To date, however, the strategy has not been fully implemented in the prevailing context, owing to the fact that UNOCI has been systematically prevented from implementing its mandate, including the strategy and the promotion and protection of human rights, by LMP supporters and officers and members of the FDS loyal to Mr. Gbagbo. The measures taken against UNOCI and its staff in this regard have included obstructing and restricting United Nations movement through the country, preventive and targeted attacks against United Nations personnel and property and turning back United Nations staff at the airport. B. Recommendations 47. In the light of the above, the High Commissioner makes the recommendations below. 1. To the Government of Côte d’Ivoire 48. The High Commissioner recommends that the Government: (a) Conduct in-depth, independent and impartial investigations into all politically-related violence, including serious human rights violations and abuses perpetrated during the period under review, and hold all perpetrators to account; 16