A/HRC/42/CRP.3 a contract reportedly worth about USD 204 million.381 The fighter planes are also produced by the State-owned Irkutsk Corporation. In January 2018, the Tatmadaw carried out airstrikes in Tanai, Kachin State, in which civilians were killed and property was destroyed, causing displacement and destruction of livelihoods.382 The Mission received credible reports that the Tatmadaw used Mil Mi-35 helicopter gunships in the attack.383 156. Media reports of statements from government officials provided the Mission with general and specific confirmation of several of these transfers. They also made it clear that the equipment had been or would be used in contexts—namely counter-insurgency and counterterrorism operations—in which the Tatmadaw was notorious for committing violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law. In early 2018, Russian Federation Deputy Defence Minister Alexander Fomin was publicly quoted as saying the fighter planes would “become the main fighter aircraft of Myanmar’s air force to protect the country’s territorial integrity and repel any terror threats.” 384 At a press conference following the 8th Moscow Conference on International Security in April 2019, Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing said that Russia’s military hardware was “very useful” for his military in key locations in Myanmar. 385 The State-owned newspaper Global New Light of Myanmar also reported that a military delegation led by Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing visited the Irkutsk Aviation Plant on 23 April 2019.386 157. In addition to the credible reports and high profile attention at the United Nations given to the Myanmar human rights crisis described in paragraph 152 above, Russia also knew or ought to have known from the acts of other States about the adverse international human rights law and international humanitarian law consequences its arms transfers would have. This includes the arms embargoes imposed by numerous other governments, many of which were maintained or widened in reaction to widespread violence and human rights violations by the military and other security forces against minority groups in Rakhine, Kachin and Shan States.387 158. The Mission’s investigation also found arms transfers arriving from China. In May 2017, it was reported that the Tatmadaw was acquiring SY-400 short-range precision surfaceto-surface ballistic missile systems, manufactured by the China State-owned China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation.388 In November 2018, the Tatmadaw Air Force received its first six JF-17M “Thunder” combat aircraft out of a total of 16 aircraft ordered in 2015 on a USD 560 million contract with the Chinese State-owned Aviation Industry 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 56 Andrew Selth, “Myanmar: pariah status no bar to defence modernisation,” The Lowy Institute (https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/myanmar-pariah-status-no-bar-defence-modernisation). GI-011, GI-026, A/HRC/39/CRP.2, paragraphs 310, 311. PM-008. Oliver Slow, “Amid Continued Criticism, Myanmar Still Spending Big on Military,” VOA News, 1 February 2018 (https://www.voanews.com/a/myanmar-military-spending/4234303.html). Moe Myint, “Russia Building Six Advanced Fighter Jets for Myanmar Military,” 25 April 2019 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/russia-building-six-advanced-fighter-jets-myanmarmilitary.html). The Global New Light of Myanmar, “Senior General visits Irkutsk Aviation Plant, Irkutsk town,” 23 April 2019 (http://www.globalnewlightofmyanmar.com/senior-general-visits-irkutsk-aviation-plantirkutsk-town/). See paragraph 148. For example, in February 2018, the EU Council condemned widespread, systematic grave human rights violations committed by the Myanmar military and other security forces. It confirmed the relevance of the existing embargo and on 26 April 2018 it expanded the restrictive measures on Myanmar with a prohibition on the export of dual-use goods for military and Border Guard Police end users, restrictions on the export of equipment for monitoring communications that might be used for internal repression, and on military training and military cooperation. See: Council Regulation (EU) 2018/647 of 26 April 2018 amending Regulation (EU) No 401/2013 concerning restrictive measures in respect of Myanmar/Burma. “Myanmar looks to buy Chinese SY-400 ballistic missile systems,” 5 May 2017 (https://defenceblog.com/news/myanmar-looks-to-buy-chinese-sy-400-ballistic-missile-systems.html).