A/HRC/42/CRP.3 equipment,408 as the recipient and end-user of the goods would be the Tatmadaw, the armed forces of the recipient country.409 These goods and technologies may also be subject to other export controls, as prescribed by the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies.410 According to the Myanmar defence budget, the Tatmadaw procured or sought to procure these goods and technology from companies in several Wassenaar Arrangement countries, including Austria, Canada, Japan, Norway, South Africa, and the United Kingdom. Legal findings 166. International law provides various legal frameworks that regulate weapons and other equipment transfers from State to State, aiming to prevent the types of violations the Mission has documented in Myanmar. Under international human rights law, State parties to the ICCPR must take appropriate legislative and other measures to ensure that all activities taking place in whole or in part within their territory or under their jurisdiction, but having a direct and reasonably foreseeable impact on the right to life of individuals outside their territory, are consistent with the right to life and with the right of victims to obtain an effective remedy.411 167. The Mission finds reasonable grounds to conclude that China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, India, Israel, Philippines, Russia, and Ukraine allowed the arms and armsrelated transfers and assistance to Myanmar. Based on the types of items and assistance provided, China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Israel, Russia, and Ukraine knew or ought to have known that doing so would have a direct and reasonably foreseeable adverse impact on the human rights of people in Myanmar. This is contrary to the ICCPR, to which the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Israel, Russia, and Ukraine are all State parties. China is a signatory. By implication, these countries also failed to effectively apply human rights due diligence to the transfers. Given the totality of the circumstances, the Mission is also of the view that India and the Philippines should not have permitted the transfer of arms and related items to the Tatmadaw. Further investigation is required with respect to the nature of arms or related items that Myanmar may have procured from two businesses based in Singapore, which is not a party or a signatory to the ICCPR. 168. The Mission similarly concludes that China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Israel, Russia, and Ukraine failed to refrain from transferring weapons although they expected or ought to have expected, based on the facts or their knowledge of past patterns of the Tatmadaw, that the weapons would be used in acts that violate international human rights law and international humanitarian law.412 169. For this reason, these States provided arms and other related equipment in breach of their Common Article 1 obligations as a matter either of treaty law or of customary international humanitarian law. The Mission also reached the conclusion under the general rules of State responsibility that prohibit aiding or assisting another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act, that these States knew, or were virtually certain, that the assistance would be used for unlawful purposes. Although the Mission did not have enough information to conclude that an unlawful act did actually occur, the gravity of this finding is aggravated by the fact that the Tatmadaw has engaged in “serious breaches”, which prohibits States from rendering aid or assistance in maintaining the situation (even if the breach has ceased) that arose from those breaches. As noted above, given the totality of the circumstances, the Mission is also of the view that India and the Philippines should not have permitted the transfer of arms and related items to the Tatmadaw. Further investigation is required with respect to the application of these rules to Singapore. 408 409 410 411 412 European Union Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment. Article 6, European Union Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment. See Wassenaar Arrangement, “List of dual-use goods and technologies and munitions list”, December 2018. See paragraph 27. See paragraph 29. 59