A/HRC/42/CRP.3 or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children, all of which have occurred in the Myanmar context. 173. Having found that Israel and Ukraine should not have transferred or enabled the assembly of conventional arms, the Mission need not evaluate whether Israel and Ukraine undertook an effective assessment equivalent to Article 7. Nonetheless, the Mission is of the view that an overriding risk existed and, for that additional reason, the items should not have been exported. 174. In addition to the obligations on States to regulate arms transfers, the Mission has reasonable grounds to conclude that, due to widespread knowledge of the Tatmadaw’s abhorrent human rights record, arms transferring businesses in China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Israel, Russia, and Ukraine should not have permitted the transfers. The Mission reminds these businesses that they should effectively apply relevant international human rights principles in line with their corporate responsibility to respect human rights. Businesses involved in the sale of arms and dual-use goods (see paras. 175-176 below) should also carry out effective human rights due diligence to determine whether they can put in place preventive or mitigation measures (such as restrictions on where and how the equipment could be used) and, if not, should decline making the sale. Given the totality of the circumstances, the Mission is also of the view that India and Philippines-based businesses should not have permitted the transfer of arms and related items to the Tatmadaw. Further investigation is needed into the nature of arms or related items that Myanmar may have procured from two businesses based in Singapore. 175. The Mission also takes note of at least seven companies from which, since 2016, the Tatmadaw procured or sought to procure information and communications technology. Moreover, as the EU control of exports of military technology and equipment419 makes clear, dual-use goods and technology, for which there are serious grounds for believing that their end-user will be the armed forces or internal security forces or similar entities in the recipient country, are considered, for the purposes of export control, as military technology or equipment.420 The inclusion of information and communications technology from identified companies on the Myanmar Ministry of Defence military budget makes clear that the recipient and end-user of the goods and technology would be the Tatmadaw. Austria and the United Kingdom, which are listed as confirmed or potential sources of such goods and technologies in the Tatmadaw’s budget, are subject to EU export control rules. 176. In addition, the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls list of dual-use goods and technologies includes information security technology; target acquisition, designation, range-finding, surveillance or tracking systems; cameras; and software, all of which the Tatmadaw procured or sought to procure since 2016 under the official Ministry of Defence budget.421 Wassenaar Arrangement participating States are expected to apply export controls to all items on its list of dual-use goods and technologies.422 Austria, Canada, Japan, Norway, South Africa, and the United Kingdom, are all participating States in the Wassenaar Arrangement. 419 420 421 422 European Union Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment. Article 6, European Union Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment. Wassenaar Arrangement, “List of dual-use goods and technologies and munitions list”, December 2018. See Wassenaar Arrangement, “List of dual-use goods and technologies and munitions list”. 61