A/HRC/23/21 not accused of a crime, but held under administrative detention, which is inconsistent with international humanitarian law requirements of prompt charges and trial in the event of detention. On her second arrest, Ms. Shalabi commenced a hunger strike that put her at grave risk of death. Israeli authorities agreed to her release, but only on the condition that she be deported to Gaza, which is away from her family. Such a deportation was clearly punitive, and was disturbingly insensitive to Ms. Shalabi’s needs for family and medical support after her experience. The Special Rapporteur recorded other accounts of prison conditions confronting Palestinians: solitary confinement, denial of family visits, punishment of prisoners on a hunger strike, punishment for purely political activity, and inadequate medical facilities and treatment. The Special Rapporteur also heard complaints about the difficulties encountered in access to United Nations officials to express grievances, summed up by one comment: “When you live this experience it is completely different from talking about it.” The situation of Palestinian prisoners in discussed in detail below. B. Economic and social conditions 16. Several meetings were held with United Nations officials and non-governmental organization representatives and experts relevant to an assessment of social and economic conditions. Field visits were conducted to examine some of the difficulties with water and sewage facilities, and to view damage inflicted by Operation “Pillar of Defense”. The mission met with the Deputy Director of UNRWA in Gaza, who imparted some key information. His general conclusions are important: (a) UNRWA is “vastly underfunded” to give needed services, especially food, to that portion of the Gazan population that is dependent on aid; (b) The character of dependence is so acute as to qualify as an of “emergency”; (c) The Israeli blockade is responsible for this crisis of dependency, with an astounding 70 per cent of Gazans being aid-dependent today, compare with only 10 per cent prior to the blockade in 2007; (d) The struggle to restore housing destroyed during Operation “Cast Lead” was expected to be completed in 2013, but that goal was now unachievable given the $20 million in damage done during Operation “Pillar of Defense”; (e) The water situation is desperate, with 90 per cent of Gazan aquifers “unfit for human consumption” and Israel diverting a disproportionate share of the coastal aquifer. 17. It was emphasized that allowing exports would “do wonders” to restore economic viability. Another concrete step would be for Israel to allow Palestinian agricultural activity nearer to the buffer zone that Israel establishes for security reasons on the Gaza side of the border. The insufficiency of electricity availability and the contaminated water supply are among the most serious challenges. It was reported that the tunnel network forces the population to rely on the black market for many consumer goods, a dynamic that strengthens Hamas, which gains large revenue by taxing tunnel traffic, and weakens the Palestinian Authority, which obtains revenue from products that enter or leave Gaza through the crossings. 18. To improve longer-term prospects in Gaza, several steps are essential: (a) Lifting the blockade is necessary if the economy is to be normalized, which would still require five to 10 years of unimpeded effort; (b) Financing the construction of a major desalination facility; (c) Shifting agricultural production to less water-intensive crops; 9