A/HRC/41/41 friends.80 The Human Rights Council has unequivocally expressed its concern “at measures in violation of international human rights law that aim to or that intentionally prevent or disrupt access to or dissemination of information online”.81 Social media tax 54. The Special Rapporteur is concerned that the recent imposition of taxes for the use of social media in some countries may disproportionately affect vulnerable peoples’ ability to exercise the freedoms of association and assembly, and that these “social media taxes” may raise concerns of necessity or proportionality. For example, the social media tax in Uganda “disproportionately and negatively impacts the ability of users to gain affordable access to the Internet, and thus unduly restricts their right to freedom of expression and their rights of peaceful assembly and association – particularly so for low-income citizens, for whom purchasing 1 GB of data per month will cost nearly 40 per cent of their average monthly income”. 82 While there may be legitimate economic rationales for these taxes, States should take measures to ensure that the taxes do not disproportionately impede the ability of individuals to communicate with other members of society, and widen the digital divides. Surveillance using digital tools 55. Unnecessary and disproportionate surveillance measures have increased across the world during the past decade. The necessity requirement implies demonstrating how surveillance would achieve a stated purpose, something often jeopardized by the very act of surveillance. States such as Australia and the United Kingdom, for example, assert that national security or public order justifies weakening encryption tools. 83 As stated by the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, “there is widespread consensus among information security experts that such vulnerabilities impose significant costs on digital security overall, as they may be exploitable by unauthorized third parties even if they are intended solely for government access”.84 56. The proportionality principle requires proof that the measure used is the least invasive option. Mass surveillance or bulk collection and analysis of all communications metadata85 – explicitly designed to target associations between individuals – is inherently disproportionate. 86 Similarly, legal requirements on communications service providers to store personal and sensitive data locally and register SIM cards on an indiscriminate basis allow authorities to access information which is not relevant and material to any serious crime or specific threat.87 Mandatory SIM card registration laws in particular “effectively require the majority of the population to divulge personally identifiable information” to the State concerned. 88 Face recognition technology deployed at large cultural events, major sporting events, music festivals and political gatherings also raises proportionality concerns. Similarly, International Mobile Subscriber Identity capture devices (IMSI catchers)89 allow countries to collect data from thousands of mobile phones in a specific area, or at public events such as political demonstrations. Such practices are used to identify and surveil all individuals who participate in a particular event or are present in a certain 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 14 Jan Rydzak, Global Network Initiative, “Disconnected: a human rights-based approach to network disruptions”. See Human Rights Council resolution 38/7. See UGA 3/2018. See A/HRC/35/28/Add.1. See A/HRC/38/35/Add.5. Metadata refers to the information associated with a communication, such as geolocation, duration of communication, and who the parties are. See Human Rights Council resolution 34/7. A/HRC/29/32, para. 51; and A/HRC/35/22, para. 20. Ibid. See A/HRC/35/28/Add.1.