A/HRC/34/55 1. Pressure of demand 59. A major enabling factor for illegal adoptions is the significant discrepancy between the number of prospective parents seeking to adopt and the number of children who are truly adoptable. The discrepancy is greatest in respect of the most sought-after children (generally, those who are young and healthy), while the children most often found in care are older and have a variety of specific requirements. The unrealistic number of prospective parents fuels frustration and sometimes leads to the commission of illegal acts to obtain the much lower number of adoptable children. 60. The disproportionate demand for adoption is particularly relevant in the context of intercountry adoptions and leads to excessive pressures from receiving countries on countries of origin.52 Furthermore, when the number of intercountry adoptions suddenly and rapidly increases in a country of origin, the existing infrastructure will often not be able to cope, intensifying the risk of illegal acts and illicit practices. 2. Financial transactions 61. The lack of transparency regarding the costs of an adoption and other related payments are at the root of most illegal acts. Particularly in the context of intercountry adoptions, the costs of the whole procedure are not set, which leads to great fluctuations in prices and many opportunities for corruption. Nor is there transparency regarding the purpose and use of other “adoption-related payments”, blurring further the line between required and unjustified amounts. 53 Payments also create a dependency (e.g. among “orphanages” and intermediaries) that can fuel illegal adoptions. 54 62. The undue payment of intermediaries both in the context of domestic and intercountry adoptions is a major issue, as shown in the country profiles maintained by the Bureau of Consular Affairs of the United States Department of State, which describe the practice of unofficially expediting the transfer of money or unexpected fees, as well as donations, to several countries of origin. 55 63. The linking of development aid to intercountry adoptions is another type of transaction that jeopardizes the transparency of the process and can lead to violations of the rights of the child. 56 Faced with the possibility of obtaining a large sum of money for processing an adoption, many countries of origin make sure that children are available for adoption regardless of the actual need. In Viet Nam, for example, agencies are required to provide humanitarian aid before they can process an adoption. 57 The provision of development aid has the perverse effect of encouraging countries of origin to “procure” children for adoption; in most cases, the aid will not contribute to the delivery of alternative care for children. 64. Similarly, direct donations to childcare institutions in the context of intercountry adoptions — construed as “care costs” for children whose adoption order is being finalized — increase the risk of illegal adoptions. Such costs, which are generally not fixed and often far exceed the local expenditures, are an indication that a profit-driven scheme is involved. In Haiti, for example, a fixed amount is charged by childcare institutions for the care of 52 53 54 55 56 57 14 See https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/aa/pdfs/ 2015NarrativeAnnualReportonIntercountryAdoptions.pdf. See https://assets.hcch.net/upload/wop/factsheet_finasp_en.pdf. See https://assets.hcch.net/upload/wop/note33fa2015_en.pdf. See https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information.html. CRC/C/ESP/CO/3-4. See https://www.unicef.org/vietnam/Eng_Adoption_report.pdf, pp. 57-65.