A/HRC/41/35/Add.3 use public funds to support the design of surveillance technologies. For example, the government of South Africa has reportedly provided funding to VASTech SA (Pty) Limited, a private surveillance company that designs and sells mass surveillance hardware and software. In 2011, reports surfaced that the company had sold surveillance products to the Gaddafi regime in Libya. (ALT Advisory et al., 9). IV. The obligations of states The Wassenaar Arrangement 22. Currently, there are very few systems that govern cross-border transfers of surveillance technology. As the main report illustrates, the Wassenaar Arrangement provides guidelines and norms for export of the items on the List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and the Munitions List. (Access Now, 1) The Wassenaar Arrangement, a voluntary body with 42 participating states, aims to “contribute to regional and international security and stability, by promoting transparency and great responsibility” and “keep these powerful tools from those who would counter the coalition’s goals.” (Access Now, 1) 23. Under the Wassenaar Arrangement, the members agree to apply export controls to the List, which includes dual-use technology such as surveillance tools. (Access Now, 1). For example, in 2010, “laser microphones,” which are used to eavesdrop on conversation, were added to the list and in 2012, phone monitoring technology was added to the list to control mobile and satellite phone monitoring equipment. (Privacy International, 4) The List further expanded in 2013 with inclusion of intrusion software and internet monitoring technology, and the additions were aimed at “surveillance and law enforcement/intelligence gathering tools and Internet Protocol (IP) network surveillance systems or equipment, which, under certain conditions, may be detrimental to international and regional security and stability.” (Privacy International, 5). 24. Some members, like EU States, have incorporated substantial parts of the Wassenaar Arrangement while other States such as Argentina and have not proactively implemented the provisions of the agreement. (AI Sur, 4) Furthermore, there are non-participating members of the Wassenaar Arrangement, such as Israel, that have included items from the Wassenaar Arrangement’s control list to its own list of controlled goods. (Privacy International, 6.)The following section discusses the export regimes of some of the members of the Wassenaar Arrangement. EU Framework 25. Several submissions discuss the EU’s export control regime established under Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 and the recent efforts to review and update the framework. EU export controls were initially established to regulate weapons of mass destruction but was expanded to include dual-use technology including cyber-surveillance technologies. (Access Now, 1) Recognizing the increasing risks of cybertools for mass surveillance, monitoring, tracking and interception and their impact on human rights, the European Commission proposed a review of the current export control regime. (Access Now, 2; Privacy International, 6) Some of the recent developments include establishment of a Subcommittee, the Surveillance Technology Working Group (STEG), which is tasked with identifying surveillance technology that poses risk to human rights and the effective ways to control them. (Privacy International, 6) The 2013 additions (intrusion software and internet monitoring technology) to the Wassenaar list were also added into the EU Dual Use regulation in January 2015. (Id., 5) 26. However, submissions expresses concern that because any changes to the regulation requires unanimous approval by the EU members, progress is slow and the text of the reform is yet to be finalized. (Amnesty International, 5; Privacy International, 6.) Domestic Export Control Laws 27. Several submissions discuss domestic laws implemented by both the members and non-members of the Wassenaar Arrangement. Many submissions reflect efforts by some 7