A/HRC/22/8 discrimination and exclusion. Those Guatemalan realities, disregarded by some States and by some Guatemalans people, were the guiding framework of the three national pacts, which prioritized the Government’s objectives, and of the proposed legal and institutional reform, which included a constitutional reform that incorporated fundamental changes, necessary for a new Guatemala, democratic and inclusive. Two reforms derived from the peace agreements. The first one referred to the multi-ethnic, multicultural and multilingual character of the nation, recognizing the identity as peoples of indigenous nationals and their related rights, such as the recognition of their languages as official languages, thus enabling the end of discrimination and exclusion. The second reform was aimed at establishing limitations to the Army’s functions in internal security, as temporary and extraordinary support to the civilian Security Forces, under the command of the civil authority. The Army would submit a report to the civil authority at the end of the mission. 9. The Constitutional Reform also contemplated reforming the system of election of parliamentary representatives and electoral districts to enhance Congress’ representativeness and legitimacy; to separate the administrative and jurisdictional functions of the judiciary; to create a judicial career including judges of superior courts now elected by Congress; and to increase the budget of the judiciary, the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the General Comptroller’s Office, and budget allocations to municipalities. 10. In conformity with the Esquipulas agreements, the Government and the four guerrilla fronts had negotiated an amnesty, with the participation of the United Nations and the support of the Group of Countries, friends of the peace process. The amnesty had been enacted as law by a legitimate Congress, democratically elected. That reality had also been disregarded. 11. Aware of the need to end the conflict, while at the same time aware of reluctance from victims, the Government and the guerrilla conditioned the amnesty to a report on the historical truth, without judicial effects. The report was drafted by a commission composed of notable national and international members, without the Government’s participation. The amnesty was also conditioned to a National Programme of Reparation for the Victims. 12. Historical truth and reparation were – for the Government of Guatemala – the key elements of reconciliation, and the possible extent of post-conflict justice. To end the conflict, the amnesty was required. Although not acceptable to everybody, it was necessary to lay down arms and avoid further death and destruction. 13. The judicial processes that had been initiated to challenge the amnesty, prevented or made it impossible to carry out investigations and record testimonies. The historical truth needed to be reached in order that adequate reparation could be granted and reconciliation reached. The Government expected the superior courts of Guatemala to settle the debate on the legal effects and scope of the amnesty soon, in order to facilitate reconciliation processes. 14. It should also be taken into account that the democratic transition had resulted in an enormous number of human rights institutions that had not been efficient, owing to their dispersion and lack of coordination. The Presidential Human Rights Commission and the Peace Secretary maintained structures and functions created on the basis of the armed conflict, which did not adequately coordinate with human rights offices within other ministries and secretaries. The Government was committed, and had assumed a pledge before the Human Rights Council to the effect, to redesigning the human rights institutional system of Guatemala. In that regard, it had requested assistance from OHCHR-Guatemala. 15. Guatemala had ratified the Rome Statute to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and enacted the law creating the national mechanism to prevent torture. 4