A/HRC/28/74 such measures are authorized under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. 10 In a recent article, one author stated that “…one can distinguish the unilateral sanctions practice of individual states and organizations – such as the EU, the US, Canada or Japan – from the mandatory sanctions of the [Security Council]”.11 This approach to defining unilateral coercive measures currently seems to have, more or less, gained support. Owing to the current increased use of what are referred to as “targeted” or “smart sanctions” employed by States against individuals, groups and/or entities believed to be in a position of power to influence or determine actions in targeted States, defining the term “unilateral coercive measures” should also consider taking these categories of persons or entities into account. 9. On the basis of the above considerations, the working definition of the term “unilateral coercive measures” preferred for the purposes of the present study is “the use of economic, trade or other measures taken by a State, group of States or international organizations acting autonomously to compel a change of policy of another State or to pressure individuals, groups or entities in targeted states to influence a course of action without the authorization of the Security Council”. 10. Sanctions, including unilateral coercive measures employed by States, take different forms or a combination of measures, ranging from the restriction or disruption of trade, or financial and investment flows between sender and targeted countries to restrictions on social and cultural exchanges.12 Most of these categories of sanctions, usually called traditional or comprehensive sanctions, involve coercive measures intended to impose economic pressure on targeted States by preventing them from importing or exporting certain goods and services deemed strategically important, or more specifically target banking and financial sectors of targeted States. “Targeted” or “smart sanctions” are regarded as new forms of coercive measures aimed at applying pressure to persons or entities thought to hold political decision-making power in targeted Governments or persons deemed to engage in terrorism or other forms of violence and whose behaviour is thought to be undesirable from the perspective of the sender State. These sanctions may comprise the freezing of assets or travel bans on individuals, groups or entities in targeted countries; they may also target particular commodities from being exported from targeted States or entering such States (such as diamonds or luxury goods, or arms embargoes). 13 11. Different sanctions imply a different negative impact on human rights. The motivations for sanctions may vary significantly, and in some case are even used as a geopolitical weapon. It seems almost certain that reshaping local and global markets, destroying competitive economies, challenging sovereign credibility and leadership, endangering conciliatory talk, destabilizing Governments and transforming independent countries into failed States may induce a downturn in global economic growth. Such situations may in turn lead to negative consequences for the livelihood of disadvantaged populations in sanctioned countries, including in the country of origin of the sanctions. 12. Unilateral coercive measures that are comprehensive in nature are intended to cause economic and political hardship for targeted States; they therefore make no real distinction between States and the civilian population, including women and children and other marginalized groups, residing in targeted States, who bear the brunt of such severe 10 11 12 13 See A/HRC/24/20, para. 11 and the presentation made by Antonios Tzanakopoulos, available on the OHCHR website dedicated to the issue of human rights and unilateral coercive measures. Clara Portela, “The EU’s Use of ‘Targeted’ Sanctions: Evaluating Effectiveness”, EU Foreign Policy, CEPS Working Document, No.391, 11 March 2014. For a more detailed description of sanctions, see E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/33. See Bernard Sitt et al., Sanctions and Weapons of Mass Destruction in International Relations (Geneva, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2010). 5