A/HRC/31/68 III. Dynamics of the conflict 14. In March 2016, the Syrian Arab Republic will enter the sixth year of a conflict that has caused untold suffering to its population. 15. The intensity of fighting has fluctuated among different regions according to the actors involved and the strategic value of the objectives at stake. In recent months, the most intense hostilities have set government forces and their allies against the rebels in Latakia, Idlib and Aleppo governorates, and Islamic State in Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS) against YPG forces and their allies in Hasakah and Ar Raqqah. The situation in southern governorates has remained broadly unchanged despite incessant confrontations. 16. Most parties to the conflict continue to employ siege warfare on neighbourhoods and localities (albeit to different degrees) in combination with continuous bombardment. Whenever the tactical circumstances have allowed, the sieges have been imposed in an attempt to force opponents and their supporting communities to surrender or to extract political concessions. 17. The conflict has devolved into a multisided proxy war steered from abroad by an intricate network of alliances. States, entities and individuals outside the Syrian Arab Republic have supported all sides, profoundly shaping their operational capabilities and performance. Paradoxically, the international and regional stakeholders that are ostensibly pushing for a peaceful solution to the war are the same that continue to feed the military escalation. 18. In this regard, the direct and active military intervention of external State actors has escalated. The international coalition, led by the United States of America and involving a number of Western and Arab countries, continues its air operations against ISIS. It has provided air support to military ground operations conducted in north-eastern governorates by SDF, facilitating its progress farther south into areas held by ISIS. The coalition’s airstrikes have also continued to target the terrorist group’s financial and operational resources in Dayr az-Zawr. 19. The Russian Federation has intensified its involvement through the deployment of an air force group in Latakia, reportedly pursuant to a request from the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic. Since beginning its air strikes on 30 September 2015, the Russian forces have provided – in coordination with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic – close air support to ground operations conducted by the State forces and their supporting militia, enabling their expansion in large areas. Besides the Al-Qaida affiliate Jabhat alNusra and some of its tactical allies, the air strikes have also targeted the anti-government armed groups battling pro-government forces initially in the north-west of the Syrian Arab Republic before extending its strikes to all other restive governorates. Russian sorties also attacked ISIS command centres, logistical assets and training camps in Ar Raqqah, Homs and Dayr az-Zawr. 20. Simultaneously, spillover effects, including border insecurity and the outflow of refugees, have spread beyond neighbouring countries, affecting other regions of the world and confirming the risk of the internationalization of the conflict. The sectarian schism sustained by extremist actors on different sides has also contributed to the recent escalation between regional powers. 21. Government forces and their allies have recently regained the operational initiative on a number of fronts, reversing the conflict trajectory to their advantage. Bolstered by the Russian airstrikes and foreign militia reinforcements, they have made substantial advances during large offensive operations in the countryside of Latakia and Aleppo governorates, 5