A/HRC/11/2 page 10 juvenile offender taking place. In two cases, I was subsequently informed by the Government that the death penalty had been quashed on appeal (A/HRC/8/3/Add.1); in another case, I was subsequently informed by a source that the juvenile offender had been released (the Government did not respond to my urgent appeals in these cases). Finally, in two cases, I called the Government’s attention to reports that such executions had already taken place. In neither of those cases did the Government confirm or deny the reports. 30. Unfortunately, the level of government responses to communications is particularly low in cases concerning the imposition of the death penalty against juvenile offenders. Thus, 33 communications over a two-year period have drawn only four responses, amounting to a response rate of about 12 per cent. Moreover, since February 2008, no responses to communications regarding the use of the death penalty against juvenile offenders have been received. 31. It might be asked why the Council should be especially concerned with this particular issue, when a relatively small number of juveniles have actually been executed. The answer is threefold. First, matters concerning the right to life are of fundamental importance, a fact which has consistently been recognized by the Council and its predecessor. Second, the juvenile death penalty is a negation of the essential principles of juvenile justice endorsed by a wide range of United Nations bodies and accepted by all States. Third, the credibility of the Council is called into question if it fails to respond in any way to a situation involving repeated violations of an international standard that is entirely unambiguous and universally proclaimed. 32. Based on the correspondence that I have engaged in with Governments and on the replies received, there would appear to be four possible obstacles in the way of eliminating the juvenile death penalty, not just on paper, but in practice. 33. The first obstacle seems to be a misunderstanding of the precise age at which an individual ceases to be a juvenile. Thus, for example, the Government of Saudi Arabia reported that it applies “regulations ... stipulat[ing] that a person can be held criminally responsible for acts that he commits after reaching the age of majority, which differs from one individual to another” (A/HRC/8/3/Add.1, p. 343). Similarly, article 7 (1) of the Arab Charter on Human Rights, which entered into force on 15 March 2008, provides that “Sentences of death shall not be imposed on persons under 18 years of age, unless otherwise stipulated in the laws in force at the time of the commission of the crime.” While the Convention on the Rights of the Child leaves room in article 1 for the setting of an age below 18 years for specific purposes, this is not in fact the case in relation to the death penalty. To the contrary, the Convention is absolutely clear in article 37 (a) in establishing 18 years as the minimum age attained at the time of the relevant crime in order for an individual to be potentially subject to the death penalty in those jurisdictions that have retained it. Unlike other provisions of the Convention, this prohibition is not flexible when account is taken of the individual development and maturity of the offender. The Committee on the Rights of the Child has emphasized these points in relation to Saudi Arabia.14 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights similarly admits no 14 CRC/C/SAU/CO/2, para. 32.