A/HRC/30/42 countries reconsider issues such as the separation of powers and endeavo ur to limit executive powers. The 2010 Constitution of Kenya, for example, curbs some of the powers given to the President by the 1963 Constitution and successive amendments, which had increased the powers of the President while weakening the legislature and the judiciary. Most recently, the authorities in Sri Lanka presented to parliament the XIX Amendment, ending the era of the so-called “executive presidency”, devolving to parliament some of the powers that the office of the President had accumulated over time to the detriment of the remaining State powers. 5. Limiting the scope of military justice 70. Militaries in most countries operate their own courts because the military relies on distinct regulations, laws and codes of conduct, and the enforcement of those codes, including disciplinary procedures, requires special mechanisms. International law, however, is clear that the jurisdiction of military courts is restricted to trying members of the military for military offenses, to the exclusion of human rights violations and serious violations of international humanitarian law. 41 Trying civilians in military courts or trying members of the military for crimes other than military crimes contravenes international law. Circumventing this key principle is one of the most prevalent ways of shielding violations committed by the military from accountability. 6. Establishing a constitutional court 71. Many transitioning countries, including virtually all the countries in the “third wave” of democratization, 42 have introduced a separate constitutional court, largely following the lead of Germany after the Second World War. 43 The establishment of such courts distinguishes the adjudication of routine, ordinary matters from crucial decisions on fundamental rights. This distinction provides an elegant way out of a dilemma faced by countries that do not trust judges appointed by a predecessor regime to be the last arbiters of the most fundamental rights -related questions, but that cannot afford to vet the judiciary. 72. There is no court, however, that can be entirely responsible for the protection of rights if other branches of power are determined to commit violations , or if nonState actors are determined to commit abuses. Similarly, no court, on its own, can sustain the rule of law in the face of attacks from other powers or indifference from citizens. 44 Membership in constitutional courts can be manipulated, judges coerced 45 or corrupted, and new ways of subverting legal order, which constitutional courts were not designed to counter, have emerged. 46 73. Notably, for a constitutional court to be effective in protecting individuals’ rights and preventing violations, it needs to be vested with an individual complaints 41 42 43 44 45 46 See Updated Set of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to combat impunity, principle 29. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (University of Oklahoma Press, 1993). See Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies: Contested Power in the Era of Constitutional Courts (Cambridge University Press, 2015). See Bojan Bugaric, “A crisis of constitutional democracy in post-Communist Europe: ʻLands inbetweenʼ democracy and authoritarianism”, International Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 13, Iss. 1, pp. 219-245 (2015). See, for example, the recent allegations against one member of the Burundi Constitutional Court. See David Landau, “Abusive Constitutionalism”, UC David Law Review (2013). 17