A/HRC/23/47 99. The implications for military culture are unknown, and LARs may thus undermine the systems of State and international security. I. LARs and restrictive regimes on weapons 100. The treaty restrictions76 placed on certain weapons stem from the IHL norm that the means and methods of warfare are not unlimited, and as such there must be restrictions on the rules that determine what weapons are permissible. 77 The Martens Clause prohibits weapons that run counter to the “dictates of public conscience.” The obligation not to use weapons that have indiscriminate effects and thus cause unnecessary harm to civilians underlies the prohibition of certain weapons,78 and some weapons have been banned because they “cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering” 79 to soldiers as well as civilians.80 The use of still others is restricted for similar reasons. 81 101. In considering whether restrictions as opposed to an outright ban on LARs would be more appropriate, it should be kept in mind that it may be more difficult to restrict LARs as opposed to other weapons because they are combinations of multiple and often multipurpose technologies. Experts have made strong arguments that a regulatory approach that focuses on technology – namely, the weapons themselves – may be misplaced in the case of LARs and that the focus should rather be on intent or use. 82 102. Disarmament law and its associated treaties, however, provide extensive examples of the types of arms control instruments that establish bans or restrictions on use and other activities. These instruments can be broadly characterized as some combination of type of restriction and type of activity restricted. The types of restrictions include a ban or other limitations short of a ban. 103. The type of activity that is typically restricted includes: (i) acquisition, retention or stockpiling, (ii) research (basic or applied) and development, (iii) testing, (iv) deployment, (v) transfer or proliferation, and (vi) use. 83 104. Another positive development in the context of disarmament is the inclusion of victim assistance in weapons treaties.84 This concern for victims coincides with other efforts to address the harm weapons and warfare cause to civilians, including the practice of casualty counting85 and the good faith provision of amends – implemented for example by 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 Through the Hague Convention of 1907 and the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. See http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/conduct-hostilities/methods-means-warfare/index.jsp Mine Ban Treaty (1997); and Convention on Cluster Munitions (2008). Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions, 1977. art. 35 (2); ICRC, Customary Humanitarian Law, Rule 70. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. Geneva, 17 June 1925. Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Protocol III on incendiary weapons. Marchant (see note 26 above), p. 287, Asaro see note 43 above), p. 10. Marchant (see note 26 above), p. 300. See also Bonnie Docherty “The Time is Now: A Historical Argument for a Cluster Munitions Convention” 20 Harvard Human Rights Law Journal (2007), p. 53 for an overview. Mine Ban Treaty (1997), art. 6, and Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War (2003), art. 8. The Convention on Cluster Munitions (2008), art. 5 was groundbreaking in placing responsibility on the affected State. S/2012/376, para. 28 (commending inter alia the commitment by the African Union Mission in Somalia). 19