A/HRC/23/47 they also lower casualty rates for the side that uses them (and in some cases also for the other side), thereby removing political constraints on States to resort to military action. 35 60. This argument does not withstand closer scrutiny. While it is desirable for States to reduce casualties in armed conflict, it becomes a question whether one can still talk about “war” – as opposed to one-sided killing – where one party carries no existential risk, and bears no cost beyond the economic. There is a qualitative difference between reducing the risk that armed conflict poses to those who participate in it, and the situation where one side is no longer a “participant” in armed conflict inasmuch as its combatants are not exposed to any danger.36 LARs seem to take problems that are present with drones and high-altitude airstrikes to their factual and legal extreme. 61. Even if it were correct to assume that if LARs were used there would sometimes be fewer casualties per armed conflict, the total number of casualties in aggregate could still be higher. 62. Most pertinently, the increased precision and ability to strike anywhere in the world, even where no communication lines exist, suggests that LARs will be very attractive to those wishing to perform targeted killing. The breaches of State sovereignty – in addition to possible breaches of IHL and IHRL – often associated with targeted killing programmes risk making the world and the protection of life less secure. C. The use of LARs during armed conflict 63. A further question is whether LARs will be capable of complying with the requirements of IHL. To the extent that the answer is negative, they should be prohibited weapons. However, according to proponents of LARs this does not mean that LARs are required never to make a mistake – the yardstick should be the conduct of human beings who would otherwise be taking the decisions, which is not always a very high standard.37 64. Some experts have argued that robots can in some respects be made to comply even better with IHL requirements than human beings. 38 Roboticist Ronald Arkin has for example proposed ways of building an “ethical governor” into military robots to ensure that they satisfy those requirements.39 65. A consideration of a different kind is that if it is technically possible to programme LARs to comply better with IHL than the human alternatives, there could in fact be an obligation to use them40 – in the same way that some human rights groups have argued that where available, “smart” bombs, rather than less discriminating ones, should be deployed. 66. Of specific importance in this context are the IHL rules of distinction and proportionality. The rule of distinction seeks to minimize the impact of armed conflict on civilians, by prohibiting targeting of civilians and indiscriminate attacks. 41 In situations 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 12 Anderson and Waxman (see note 8 above), p. 12. According to some commentators, war requires some willingness to accept reciprocal or mutual risk, involving some degree of sacrifice. See Paul Kahn “The Paradox of Riskless Warfare” Philosophy and Public Policy Vol. 22 (2002) and “War and Sacrifice in Kosovo” (1999), available from http://www-personal.umich.edu/~elias/Courses/War/kosovo.htm Lin (see note 34 above), p. 50. Marchant (see note 26 above), p. 280; Singer, (see note 3 above), p. 398. Arkin (see note 8 above), p. 127. Jonathan Herbach “Into the Caves of Steel: Precaution, Cognition and Robotic Weapons Systems Under the International Law of Armed Conflict” Amsterdam Law Forum Vol. 4 (2012), p. 14. Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions, 1977, arts. 51 and 57.