A/HRC/23/47 some International Security Assistance Force States – in the case of civilian deaths in the absence of recognized IHL violations. 86 These practices serve to reaffirm the value of life. 105. There are also meaningful soft law instruments that may regulate the emergence of LARs. Examples of relevant soft law instruments in the field of disarmament include codes of conduct, trans-governmental dialogue, information sharing and confidence-building measures and framework conventions. 87 In addition, non-governmental organization (NGO) activity and public opinion can serve to induce restrictions on weapons. 106. Article 36 of the First Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions is especially relevant, providing that, “in the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or methods of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting Party.” 107. This process is one of internal introspection, not external inspection, and is based on the good faith of the parties.88 The United States, although not a State party, established formal weapons mechanisms review as early as 1947. While States cannot be obliged to disclose the outcomes of their reviews, one way of ensuring greater control over the emergence of new weapons such as LARs will be to encourage them to be more open about the procedure that they follow in Article 36 reviews generally. 108. In 2012 in a Department of Defense Directive, the United States embarked on an important process of self-regulation regarding LARs, recognizing the need for domestic control of their production and deployment, and imposing a form of moratorium. 89 The Directive provides that autonomous weapons “shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgement over the use of force”. 90 Specific levels of official approval for the development and fielding of different forms of robots are identified.91 In particular, the Directive bans the development and fielding of LARs unless certain procedures are followed.92 This important initiative by a major potential LARs producer should be commended and may open up opportunities for mobilizing international support for national moratoria. IV. Conclusions 109. There is clearly a strong case for approaching the possible introduction of LARs with great caution. If used, they could have far-reaching effects on societal values, including fundamentally on the protection and the value of life and on international stability and security. While it is not clear at present how LARs could be capable of satisfying IHL and IHRL requirements in many respects, it is foreseeable that they could comply under certain circumstances, especially if used alongside human soldiers. Even so, there is widespread concern that allowing LARs to kill people may denigrate the value of life itself. Tireless war machines, ready for deployment at the push of a button, pose the danger of permanent (if low-level) armed conflict, obviating the opportunity for post-war reconstruction. The onus is on those who wish to deploy LARs to demonstrate that specific uses should in particular 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 20 Ibid., para. 29 (the Secretary General “welcomed the practice of making amends”). Marchant, see note 26, pp. 306-314. Discussed in International Review of the Red Cross vol. 88, December 2006. US DoD Directive (see note 14 above). Ibid, para 4.a. Ibid, paras 4.c and d. Ibid, Enclosure 3.