A/HRC/30/47 flagships, and not for jurisdiction over other ships. Finally, Mr. Casey-Maslen noted that evidentiary issues and ensuring the respect for the fundamental right to habeas corpus on vessels were a challenge. 64. Norway provided further details of its national legislation and regulations. The use of private security companies on board ships registered in Norway was not regulated by the act on private security companies, but by Regulation 972/2004 on Ship Security. Particular rules governing shipowners’ use of private security companies were included in the regulation in 2011. The regulation did not provide requirements directed towards the security companies themselves. Rather, it addressed the responsibilities of shipowners of informing Norwegian authorities when and why use of private security services were required; providing an assessment of the company in question including its internal recruitment and training procedures; and its regulations on use of arms. Shipowners were required to emphasize IMO guidelines in the selection and use of private security guards on board. Norwegian authorities had the competency to decide that certain private security companies might not be used by Norwegian shipowners. The regulation also stipulated when armed guards might be used; how weapons were to be stored on board; and procedures for the use of armed weapons. In 2011, Regulation 904/2009 Relative to Arms was supplemented with a provision regulating the circumstances under which ships registered in Norway might store arms on board on behalf of private security companies. Such storage was only allowed for the objective of protecting the ship against acts of terror or piracy, and required permission granted by Norwegian police. Only ships certified under the International Ship and Port Facility Security-regulations of IMO might be granted such permission, and the permission was only valid when sailing in, to or from certain geographic areas. That regulation was also followed by reporting requirements, in line with IMO guidelines, including to the Norwegian National Criminal Investigation Service if there was reason to believe that the use of force had resulted in personal injury or death. Whenever arms had been used, that had to be reported to the Maritime Directorate. D. Use of private security companies by the United Nations 65. On 29 April 2015, the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security outlined the main features of the current global security context. He referred to a recent report on the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel (A/69/406), according to which personnel served in increasingly dangerous environments and encountered a variety of threats not previously encountered. He added that the existing threat had been aggravated by the blurring of the lines between criminal and extremist groups, the expansion of the latter and the emergence of new extremist groups. Against that background, the United Nations had engaged armed private security companies in selected duty stations as a last resort, in an effort to strengthen the safety and security of its personnel and to enable the Organization to deliver its programmes and mandates in highrisk environments. That was particularly true in high-risk areas where peacekeeping forces had yet to be deployed and where critical political or humanitarian needs existed. To date, the United Nations had contracted armed private security services in three countries where peacekeeping and political missions had been established (Afghanistan, Haiti and Somalia) out of the more than 170 countries in which the United Nations maintained a presence. 66. The Under-Secretary-General stressed that the “last resort principle” guided the United Nations as to when it might be appropriate to seek out armed private security services. He added that armed private security services were engaged exceptionally, when other options, namely security services by the host Government and other Member States 17