A/HRC/4/35 page 7 also meet an overall “reasonableness” test, which includes non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States.11 Debate continues over precisely when the protection of human rights justifies extraterritorial jurisdiction. 16. The regional human rights systems also affirm the State duty to protect against non-State abuse, and establish similar correlative State requirements to regulate and adjudicate corporate acts.12 Indeed, the increasing focus on protection against corporate abuse by the United Nations treaty bodies and regional mechanisms indicates growing concern that States either do not fully understand or are not always able or willing to fulfil this duty. 17. The responses to the questionnaire survey addressed to States by the Special Representative, asking them to identify policies and practices by which they regulate, adjudicate, and otherwise influence corporate actions in relation to human rights, reinforce those concerns.13 No robust conclusions can be drawn because of the low response rate. But of those States responding, very few report having policies, programmes or tools designed specifically to deal with corporate human rights challenges. A larger number say they rely on the framework of corporate responsibility initiatives, including such soft law instruments as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, or voluntary initiatives like the United Nations Global Compact. Very few explicitly consider human rights criteria in their export credit and investment promotion policies or in bilateral trade and investment treaties, points at which government policies and global business operations most closely intersect.14 18. In sum, the State duty to protect against non-State abuses is part of the very foundation of the international human rights regime. The duty requires States to play a key role in regulating and adjudicating abuse by business enterprises or risk breaching their international obligations. 11 Of course, the entire human rights regime may be seen to challenge the classical view of non-intervention. The debate here hinges on what is considered coercive. See A/HRC/4/35/Add.2 for details. 12 For an overview, see Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford, OUP, 2006), chap. 9; on Africa, see Nsongurua Udombana, “Between promise and performance: revisiting States’ obligations under the African Human Rights Charter”, Stanford Journal of International Law vol. 40, No. 105 (2004). 13 14 See A/HRC/4/35/Add.3. Perhaps uniquely, Norway manages the global portfolio of its government pension fund in accordance with ethical guidelines, which has led to disinvestments in two major transnational companies, one on human rights grounds. http://odin.dep.no/etikkradet/english/documents/099001-110013/dok-bu.html.