A/HRC/4/35 page 11 29. There are also national differences in attributing liability within transnational corporate structures. The doctrine of separate corporate personality treats each member of a corporate group as a legally distinct entity. No uniform formula exists for “piercing the corporate veil” that separates a subsidiary from its parent company in order to hold the parent responsible for the subsidiary’s acts. One alternative that has attracted attention is for the home State to impose civil liability on the parent company for its acts and omissions regarding activities by its subsidiaries abroad.26 The rules governing extraterritorial jurisdiction suggest that such provisions are permissible. 30. Few legitimate firms may ever directly commit acts that amount to international crimes. But there is greater risk of their facing allegations of “complicity” in such crimes. For example, of the more than 40 ATCA cases brought against companies in the United States (now the largest body of domestic jurisprudence regarding corporate responsibility for international crimes), most have concerned alleged complicity where the actual perpetrators were public or private security forces, other government agents, or armed factions in civil conflicts.27 31. Corporate complicity is an umbrella term for a range of ways in which companies may be liable for their participation in criminal or civil wrongs. With nuanced differences, most national legal systems appear to recognize complicity as a concept. The international tribunals have developed a fairly clear standard for individual criminal aiding and abetting liability: knowingly providing practical assistance, encouragement or moral support that has a substantial effect on the commission of the crime.28 Where national courts adopt this standard it is likely that its application to corporations would closely track its application to individuals, although the element of “moral support” may pose specific challenges.29 32. “Moral support” can establish individual liability under international law, and the tribunals have extended it to include silent presence coupled with authority. But a company trying in good faith to avoid involvement in human rights abuses might have difficulty knowing what counts as moral support for legal purposes. Mere presence in a country and paying taxes 26 See Connelly v. RTZ Corporation plc AC 854 (1998), and Lubbe v. Cape plc 4 All ER 268 (2000) (House of Lords, UK). 27 The Supreme Court’s only decision under ATCA, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain 542 US 692 (US, 2004), does not preclude such liability for corporations, and the weight of current US judicial opinion appears to support it, although there is disagreement among lower courts over its content and, in some cases, its existence. 28 Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Judgement, No. IT-95-17/1 (ICTY Trial Chamber, 10 December 1998) and Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgement, No. ICTR-96-4-T (ICTR Trial Chamber, 2 September 1998). It is unknown whether the ICC will adopt this standard. 29 When applying the individual standard to corporations, the court in Doe v. Unocal did not adopt the element of “moral support”.