A/HRC/45/9 management sector; neither document mentions this sector specifically. Additionally, the former is applicable in armed conflict situations and the latter in so-called complex environments (see the definition in sect. B of the Code). They therefore fail to capture the broad range of companies that provide security-related services for immigration and border management and the variety of contexts and environments in which they operate. These companies are thus often left unregulated. 30. The Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 23 state that the corporate responsibility to respect human rights requires that companies “avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts through their own activities, and address such impacts when they occur” and that they “seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to their operations, products or services by their business relationships, even if they have not contributed to those impacts” (principle 13). In order to do this, companies should exercise human rights due diligence. 24 Heightened human rights due diligence may be required, commensurate with the level of risk of severe human rights impacts and the nature and context of the business operations, for example, when operating in high-risk environments. 25 Moreover, businesses should “treat the risk of causing or contributing to gross human rights abuses as a legal compliance issue wherever they operate” (principle 23). 31. Given the heightened risk of gross human rights abuses associated with the provision of private military and security services in immigration and border management, companies in this sector should pay particular attention to the human rights risks that their business activity or business relationships may pose, particularly to individuals or groups in vulnerable situations. Owing to the nature of the sector itself, as well as particular risks in a given geographic context, enterprises operating in this environment face the risk of becoming complicit in human rights abuse caused by other actors, such as State border authorities. They therefore need to exercise adequate due diligence to avoid causing, contributing to or becoming directly linked to such impacts, acts that may amount to gross human rights violations and abuse. Furthermore, “where business enterprises identify that they have caused or contributed to adverse impacts, they should provide for or cooperate in their remediation through legitimate processes” (principle 22). Where crimes are alleged, this “typically will require cooperation with judicial mechanisms” (commentary to principle 22). 32. Furthermore, through the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, States agreed to adopt a holistic and comprehensive approach to migration that is “based on international human rights law and upholds the principles of non-regression and nondiscrimination” (preamble, para. 15 (f)). The Compact, which covers several areas in which private military and security companies are active, importantly includes a section on immigration detention, in which it recalls that private actors should act in a way consistent with human rights and should be held accountable for human rights abuses. VII. Impact of private military and security services on the enjoyment of the human rights of all migrants A. Provision of research and technical expertise 33. Private military and security companies operating in immigration detention and border control exert considerable influence over national, regional and international policymaking through the provision of technical and policy expertise, reinforced through lobbying. This phenomenon appears most pronounced within the institutions of the European Union and in the United States of America. 34. These companies are actively involved in setting the research, policy and regulatory agendas of States and regional organizations and institutions, notably the European Union. Public-private forums involving representatives of public bodies and private industry 23 24 25 8 A/HRC/17/31, annex. A/73/163, para. 2. Ibid., para. 14 (c).