A/HRC/45/9 determine research priorities on the basis of which public funding is channelled to corporate entities in programmes dedicated to financing “research and development” projects. Moreover, through their participation in committees, forums and other bodies, they also ensure that their favoured technical requirements are integrated within policies, calls for proposals, tenders, bids and project specifications. This is a win-win situation for these companies, as they are awarded funding to undertake research to pilot their equipment and technologies and then benefit from subsequent contracts when Governments and regional organizations roll them out.26 35. This process has also contributed to the positioning of industry representatives as legitimate and unrivalled experts on border security who claim to deliver productivity, efficiency and effectiveness. Through this expertise, these companies frame the response to migration as one necessarily characterized by emergencies, crises and perceived threats, feeding and reinforcing the exclusionary, hard-line immigration narratives of a number of Governments. On this basis, they push for security, and often militarized, “solutions” through new and dual-use technologies. 36. Moreover, these companies have considerable in-house and external lobbying capacity, enabling a wider sphere of direct and indirect influence. In several countries, and in institutions of regional organizations, corporate representatives and public officials responsible for developing and implementing migration policies have regular interaction, for example during industry days, commercial fairs and corporate conferences. Companies also use their access to media outlets to influence the narrative, and at times, produce papers with recommendations to guide policy directions. This is facilitated by companies’ executive hiring decisions, with government officials often recruited to leadership positions in these companies. One glaring example is that of a senior government official who was instrumental in further tightening national security-focused migration policies that resulted in increased use of immigration detention, before joining the board of a company operating immigration detention centres.27 37. In Europe and North America, where most of the companies providing security services for immigration detention and border control are concentrated, industry lobby organizations representing arms and security companies have developed. Profit making provides a strong incentive to push for repressive immigration laws and practices, such as further criminalization of migration and increased use of immigration detention. Owing to their size and economic power, these companies exert significant influence over regulatory and policy decisions in different ways, ranging from discussions in the corridors of power to campaign contributions to relevant parliamentary or other decision-making bodies or individuals. 28 For example, since 2009, the United States Congress has authorized appropriation bills that require the relevant authorities to maintain a quota of beds (currently 34,000) in immigration detention centres on a daily basis, irrespective of the actual number needed, reportedly following significant lobbying and financial contributions by companies running such centres.29 38. Over the years, such companies’ influence has become pervasive and entrenched. Many States have become dependent on private military and security companies for a wide range of aspects of immigration and border management. This has resulted in a regressive shift of expertise away from States and towards the private sector. The increasing reliance on technological “solutions” that are constantly updated in line with new innovations has also made the companies behind them indispensable to the practical development and implementation of State security-centric migration policies. This has not only paved the way for the massive growth of the border security industry, but also ensured a steady 26 27 28 29 See submissions by Lemberg-Pedersen and Rübner Hansen, Transnational Institute and porCausa Foundation. See submission by the Center for International Human Rights of Northwestern Pritzker School of Law. Ibid., and submissions by Transnational Institute and porCausa Foundation. References are made throughout the present report to urgent appeals and allegation letters sent by special procedures of the Human Rights Council. All such communications are available from https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TmSearch/Results. In the present case, see USA 18/2018. See also submissions by Transnational Institute, Transnational Legal Clinic of the University of Pennsylvania Carey School of Law, Detention Watch Network and Project South. 9