A/HRC/36/55 evacuated on 12 May. In Qabun, two main rounds of evacuations were organized: the first on 14 May, which comprised 70 buses, and a subsequent round of 80 buses. The latter evacuations were followed by smaller rounds, comprising 20 buses each, on 15 May. Approximately 6,000 fighters and civilians left Qabun. The terms of the local truce were communicated to civilians on 12 May, giving them only a few days to evacuate. 27. Government forces and armed groups have routinely denied humanitarian evacuations for wounded and sick civilians and fighters until surrender (truces) and subsequent evacuation, granting it only in rare instances when exchanges between the four towns were negotiated. Civilians in Qabun, for example, recalled using tunnels connecting Qabun to eastern Ghouta, Damascus, to evacuate the wounded, although infighting between rebel factions affected the regularity of tunnel access. 28. Civilians interviewed by the Commission echoed how their decision to evacuate previously besieged areas was involuntary in nature and that they had accepted to leave because they “had no choice”. Women and children mostly followed their male heads of household. In Madaya, civilians emphasized that they did not want to abandon their land and property, but did not trust government forces enough to stay. Some women in Madaya, for example, described fear that their sons would be conscripted and a general distrust of government forces as their reasons for not reconciling. Other civilians recalled how the same fear that drove them to evacuate to Idlib also had an impact on their right to return. Those civilians feared reprisal violence or detention, noting they would not return to their homes even if given the option, with others having largely given up on the prospect. Still others had become aware that their homes had been looted or appropriated by progovernment forces. 29. Similarly, in Kafraya, interviewees described how siege conditions had forced them to evacuate despite their desire to remain. One interviewee recalled watching her children become increasingly malnourished, while another noted increased attacks and outbreaks of preventable illness that had pushed civilians to leave. Interviewees in Kafraya also expressed doubt concerning their ability to return to their homes following evacuations. 30. Often, local councils in opposition-held areas have entered into memorandums of understanding with armed groups in order to delineate responsibilities and affirm their capacities as elected officials of quasi-civil governance bodies. Despite this, neither political leaders, such as local council representatives, nor military commanders, such as pro-Government or armed group fighters, possess the requisite authority to consent to evacuation agreements on behalf of individual civilians. 7 Moreover, although some humanitarian organizations have participated in facilitating evacuations in varying capacities, including the Syrian Arab Red Crescent during the evacuations of Madaya and Tishreen, their participation does not render the underlying displacements lawful. 8 31. By evacuating to the border of Idlib Governorate civilians, including doctors, relief workers, activists, civil society staff and local council members, who are, or who are perceived to be, sympathetic to opposition factions, government forces are able to serve a calculated warring strategy: population transfers in this context remove both opposition actors and their supporters to a single area in the northwest area of the Syrian Arab Republic. Only those civilians who are offered the chance to pledge loyalty to the Government in the form of reconciliation may remain in their homes. Overall, the pattern of evacuations occurring throughout the country appears intended to engineer changes to the political demographies of previously besieged enclaves, by redrawing and consolidating bases of political support. 32. As evinced by the 15 April attack on the convoy in Al-Rashidin (see paras. 39-43 below), evacuations are perilous and desperate journeys. Civilians evacuated from Madaya, Barza, Tishreen and Qabun were only able to carry modest possessions with them, were not 7 8 See International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Mladen Naletilić, aka “Tuta” and Vinko Martinović, aka Štela, trial judgment, IT-98-34-T, 31 March 2003, para. 523. See Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, appeals judgment, para. 286; see also Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, trial judgment, IT-97-24-T, 31 July 2003, para. 683. 7