A/HRC/26/36
79.
The failure of the State to properly investigate cases of death following the use of
force is a violation of the right to life itself.51 At times there are “numerous findings of state
violations of the right to life because of the absence of an effective investigation, even
when the killing could not be found on the evidence to be firmly attributable to the state”.52
80.
Human rights treaty bodies, too, have recognized the obligation on States wherever a
death results from the use of force, as a component of the right to life.53 Content has been
provided to the term “exhaustive and impartial investigations” as including the following
factors: an official investigation initiated by the State; independence from those implicated;
capability of leading to a determination of whether force used was justified in the
circumstances; the requirement of a level of promptness and reasonable expedition; and a
level of public scrutiny.54
81.
To enable investigations, accountability and redress for the victims, important
measures, including the following must be put in place: States are obliged to provide a
system of reporting for whenever firearms are used by law enforcement officials55;
investigations should also seek to establish command responsibility; and law enforcement
officials must promptly report incidents where the use of force or firearms results in injury
or death, to their superiors.56
82.
This framework must include criminal, administrative and disciplinary sanctions.
Modes of criminal accountability must include command or superior responsibility. The
general existence of laws is not enough to ensure accountability of State officials – special
measures are needed to ensure that those in office are held responsible. Many States lack
such mechanisms.
83.
An effective remedy is dependent on an effective investigation. The General
Assembly has addressed the obligation of all States “to conduct exhaustive and impartial
investigations… to identify and bring to justice those responsible… and to adopt all
necessary measures… to put an end to impunity.”57
84.
Independent, external oversight of police is a best practice.58 However, mere
establishment of an external oversight body itself is insufficient. An effective external
police oversight agency requires the necessary powers, resources, independence,
transparency and reporting, community and political support, and civil society
involvement.59 In addition, a high degree of transparency is also required to ensure the
long-term success of the oversight agency.60
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
14
Kaya v. Turkey, European Court of Human Rights, application No. 22729/93 (19 February 1998)
paras. 86-92. and McCann and Others v the United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights,
application No. 18984/91 (27 September 1995) para. 169.
Moeckli et al. (eds.) (footnote 12 above), p. 228.
Finucane v. The United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, application No. 29178/95 (1
July 2003).
Isayeva v. Russia, European Court of Human Rights, application No. 57950/00 (24 February 2005).
Principle 11(f) and commentary to art 3 of the Code.
Principle 6.
General Assembly resolution 63/182.
A/HRC/14/24/Add.8 at para 73. Also, African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights,
Resolution on police reform, accountability and civilian police oversight in Africa (2006).
A/HRC/14/24/Add.8 at para. 74.
Ibid., paras. 61–63.
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