A/HRC/33/54 48. In 2008, the European Union member States committed themselves not to sell claims on HIPCs to creditors unwilling to provide debt relief. 57 A year earlier, members of the Paris Club endorsed the same position.58 49. Similar concerns were also expressed by the States signatories to the Doha Declaration on Financing for Development: outcome document of the Follow-up International Conference on Financing for Development to Review the Implementation of the Monterrey Consensus, adopted in 2008, in which they welcomed steps taken to prevent aggressive litigation against HIPC- eligible countries, including through the enhancement of debt buy-back mechanisms and the provision of technical assistance and legal support, and called on creditors not to sell claims on HIPCs to those that refuse to participate adequately in debt relief efforts.59 50. In 2009, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted a recommendation in which it strongly condemned the activities of vulture funds, which “have no compunction in taking advantage of opportunities arising from debt waivers granted by creditor countries, particularly European, or blocking worldwide the assets of the countries concerned and threatening them with bankruptcy”. 60 51. In 2014 and 2015, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the member States of the Group of 77 (G-77) and China recognized that the activities of vulture funds and their actions of a highly speculative nature posed a risk to all future debt restructuring processes, for both developing and developed countries. They further stressed the importance of not allowing vulture funds to paralyse the debt restructuring efforts of developing countries, and affirmed that those funds should not supersede a State’s right to protect its people under international law (see A/69/423, annex, para. 29 and A/70/410, annex, para. 33). 52. In July 2014, some one hundred civil society organizations worldwide supported the establishment of an international mechanism for the restructuring of sovereign debt “based on the obligation of States to respect, protect and enforce human rights, both in their territory and extraterritorially”.61 VII. Towards a multilateral framework on debt restructuring 53. In response to the increasing demand for international action, the General Assembly adopted on 9 September 2014 a landmark resolution entitled “Towards the establishment of a multilateral legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring processes”. Tabled at the initiative of the G-77 and China, a large majority of Member States voted in favour of the resolution.62 In the resolution, the Assembly recognized the need for a legal framework that would facilitate the orderly restructuring of sovereign debts while allowing the re57 58 59 60 61 62 14 Council of the European Union, “Council conclusions: speeding up progress towards the Millennium Development Goals”, para. 41. Press release of the Paris Club on the threats posed by some litigating creditors to heavily indebted poor countries, 22 May 2007. See General Assembly resolution 63/239, annex, para. 60. In the Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development, annexed to General Assembly resolution 69/313, signatories reiterated their concern with non-cooperative creditors who have demonstrated their ability to disrupt timely completion of the debt restructurings (para. 98). “Protecting financial aid against ʽvulture funds’”, document CM/AS(2009)Rec1870 final, 12 June 2009, para. 3. See www.cels.org.ar/common/documentos/Deuda%20Externa%20y%20DDHH%20%20CELS%20+ENG.pdf. Resolution 68/304, adopted by a vote of 124 in favour and 11 against, with 41 abstentions.