A/HRC/44/50/Add.3 57. Government regulation is merely for the purposes of entrenching the public interest principle, which more often has been violated by some NPOs that end up deviating from their intended mandate to adopting partisan positions. This is not desirable since these non-state actors are expected to be apolitical in their distribution of various charitable and developmental goods and social services to the communities. Entering into Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is one such way of engendering a public interest principle to be upheld by the PVOs. The fears by the Special Rapporteur are therefore unfounded. B. Good practices and challenges 58. The Special Rapporteur alleged “…a high level of control and even persecution that certain organisations that do not opt to be registered under the PVOA or aligned to government views” are subjected to. This is not factual and is not backed by comprehensive evidence of widespread practice. Zimbabwe has one of the highest numbers of active nonstate actors operating freely at both national and sub-national levels. All organisations which are registered in Zimbabwe adhere to legislation and laid down procedures in terms of their registered mandate and operate without any persecution or undue control as alleged by the Special Rapporteur. Routine checks of modes of operation by relevant authorities, including verification of Articles of Association and accompanying constitutive documents is provided for by the law of Zimbabwe. 59. The Government denies the assertion by the Special Rapporteur of restrictions of activities of CSOs in the country. These CSOs are currently involved in immense operations that have positively informed Government policies such as HIV and AIDS Policy and the National Gender Policy, among others. The Special Rapporteur has failed to mention the names of the specific organisations or groups that he alleges to have been restricted from operating or that have been raided by the Police. V. Conclusions and recommendations A. Conclusions 60. In his conclusions, the Special Rapporteur watered down the impact of sanctions on the economic situation in Zimbabwe and that the divisive and hostile foreign policy of Western countries against Zimbabwe has fuelled discontentment and triggered off civil disobedience, which has posed a real risk of blighting the credentials of the Government of Zimbabwe in managing assemblies. A comment on the Special Rapporteur’s disregard of the impact of sanctions on the economy and as a major cause of problems leading to difficulties in managing assemblies, is alluded to above. B. Recommendations 61. Recommendations that were proffered are noble, save for a few. Firstly, it must be noted that most recommendations are work in progress, such as aligning legislation to the Constitution with the view to give effect to progressive provisions in the Bill of Rights, particularly regarding the rights to freedom of assembly and association by way of legislation. This has been achieved through repeal of POSA and the ongoing amendment of the AIPPA. 62. However, the recommendation that Government should withdraw all criminal charges and release all those arrested because of the exercise of their rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, in particular those arrested in connection with the August 2018 and January 2019 protests, is impracticable and unjust. There are no cogent reasons as to why the State should cause the withdrawal of charges in cases where there is prima facie or overwhelming evidence pointing towards the commission of criminal offences. Is that justice in the eyes of the Special Rapporteur? Furthermore, the Executive is not mandated by law to interfere with the proper administration of justice. Thus, it will be illegal to implement this recommendation. 13