A/HRC/44/50/Add.3 9. In view of the above, the report by the Special Rapporteur is not reflective and representative of the state of affairs in Zimbabwe regarding the implementation of the two rights. II. Political, economic and social background and legal framework A. Background 10. Zimbabwe does not subscribe to some contents of the report by the Special Rapporteur as outlined hereunder. 11. The Special Rapporteur describes the land reform programme in Zimbabwe as "highly criticized". This assertion ignores the fact that the Zimbabwean land reform programme is a progressive policy designed to redistribute the primary means of production in developing countries, whose people have suffered from the policies of disempowerment by the former colonial masters. 12. For the record, Zimbabwe inherited a skewed land tenure system from the colonial era whereby a minority 4 500 white farmers owned a total of 12.5 million hectares arable land, while 7.4 million indigenous people owned only 2.5 million hectares of the total 15 million hectares of arable land in the country. An agreement was reached during the 1979 Lancaster House Independence Conference for a willing seller willing buyer land redistribution programme following financial pledges made by the then Conservative Government in Britain and the United States Government to support the exercise. 13. However, in 1997, the new British Labour Government unilaterally abrogated all the provisions that had been agreed to at Lancaster House and cut all funding previously directed at land reform. On the ground, not much progress had been made towards redistributing land as many of the white farmers were unwilling to sell land to the Government. 14. In order to remedy this situation, the Government embarked on a fast track land reform programme in 2000 to ensure that the indigenous people of Zimbabwe would finally have access to land. To date, over 360 000 families have since been resettled. 15. For the record, after the land reform programme, tobacco production has improved over the years, increasing from 228 million kilogrammes in 2000 to 258 million kilogrammes during the 2018/2019 farming season. Given proper funding, technical assistance and access to modern farming implements, indigenous farmers can achieve greater levels of productivity and significantly contribute more to the national economy. Thus, the Special Rapporteur’s attempt to dismiss the land reform programme as one of the major causes of problems in Zimbabwe today is misplaced. 16. However, the fast track land reform programme also regrettably led to international isolation and the imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe by some Western countries. These sanctions are illegal and unjustified because they violate Article 41 of the United Nations Charter, which states that sanctions can only be decided on by the UN Security Council. The USA's so-called Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) directs US Directors in the international financial institutions to block the granting of development finance to Zimbabwe. 17. As a result, Zimbabwean companies have been denied access to international credit lines and the country has not received enough foreign direct investment. This has negatively affected economic performance and worsened the living conditions of the people. The Government of Zimbabwe maintains that these measures are punitive, unjustified and outdated as they actually hinder the broad reform agenda that the Government has set for itself and, once again, calls for their unconditional removal. 18. It is evident that the Special Rapporteur was selective in his chronology and application of Zimbabwean history to buttress a skewed position that portrays the picture of a dearth of democracy and a deliberate or systematic restriction of freedoms. However, the 5