A/HRC/45/CRP.7 356. Given the particular urgency of ensuring strict compliance with international law in death penalty cases, the Group is concerned that serious violations of procedural guarantees continue to be apparent in these cases. In all the SCC (Sana’a) cases referred to above in which the death penalty was imposed, there were evident failures of due process/fair trial in the proceedings. Furthermore, the death penalty was being applied to cases outside the ‘most serious crimes’ category (that is cases involving crimes of extreme gravity involving intentional killings). In the case of the 35 members of parliament, for instance, it was being used in relation to their exercise of political rights, while in the case of the 10 journalists, the death penalty was being applied to punish freedom of expression. Individuals remain on “death row” awaiting appeals for undefined periods. While the death penalty has not been carried out in any of the Group’s emblematic cases, the Group understands that the death penalty has been carried out in other cases during the Group’s mandate. The Group reiterates the concerns expressed by other United Nations bodies in relation to the use of the death penalty in Yemen in contravention of international law.535 3. Attacks against judges and other forms of interference 357. The Group of Experts investigated how the de facto authorities, the Government of Yemen and the Southern Transitional Council are involved in exercising pressure on judges and prosecutors. Attacks, intimidation and arrests are motivated by political/security reasons and personal interests. Among cases referred to the Group in relation to Government of Yemen controlled areas, on 1 April 2020, Judge Salah Bajash, president of the Mokha Court survived an attempted assassination in which he and the Registrar of the Court remained gravely injured.536 In another case, on 31 March 2020 in Ta‘izz, the judicial compound was raided by militia operatives in plain clothes who threatened Judge Anwar Al-Majeedi because of his action in handing down a decision adverse to the interests of Hisham Abdelwahid Sarhan in a land dispute. The militia group was headed by Hisham Abdelwahid Sarhan, who is the son of Abdul Wahid Sarhan, the political security advisor of the Government of Yemen and affiliated to the Al-Islah party in Ta‘izz. 358. As a result of intimidation and attacks, judges and prosecutors not affiliated with the de facto authorities have fled from their assigned courts and relocated to those parts of the country under the control of the Government of Yemen. The appointments of judges and prosecutors loyal to the de facto authorities and the control over judicial decisions exercised by the supervisors appointed by the de facto authorities in all public offices, including the judiciary, may help to explain the relative decline in cases of attacks against judges and prosecutors in the areas under their control. During this reporting period, the Group investigated the case of a judge who was detained by de facto authorities in 2017 and accused of disclosing military locations to the enemies.537 He was never presented with formal charges, nor was he tried before a court. He was disappeared for approximately six months, until his family saw him in a video broadcast on Al-Masirah Channel, ostensibly confessing. According to former detainees who were held with him, he was tortured and his confession extorted. He remains in detention in Ta‘izz and his case has been raised with the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Yemen by the International Association of Judges. 359. In early 2020, in Aden, criticism by judges about judicial appointments by the Government of Yemen has been met with harassment and threats against the judges who spoke out. For example, some judges, including Rua Al-Mujahed, were threatened and harassed for publicly criticising the appointment of new members of the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), who were reportedly connected with or even related to existing members of the SJC. 360. Faced with this climate, some judges and prosecutors have reported self-censorship in carrying out their functions in order to avoid antagonising the party in control of an area. 535 See for instance, HRC, Concluding Observations: Yemen, CCPR/C/YEM/CO/5 (2012), para, 14 CRC, Concluding Observations: Yemen, CRC/C/YEM/CO/4 (2014), para.33; CAT Concluding Observations: Yemen CAT/C/YEM/CO/2/Rev.1 (2010), para.21. 536 Further information on this case is expected, and could assist in further developing an analysis of the situation of the judiciary. 537 Confidential source on file. 89