A/HRC/15/55* 84. Despite this success, studies indicate that the programmes exclude those who most need the stipend.31 For example, reports indicated that approximately 46 per cent of stipend resources of the Female Secondary School Assistance Project go to the non-poor and two thirds of the very poorest children are excluded.32 The Ministry of Education admits that there are leakages in the disbursement of grants, and that corruption persists. This is mainly because the targeting process concentrates decision-making powers in the hands of certain people, such as school management committee members or influential political figures. There is also a risk of “elite capture” of the programmes, since social and political pressure often results in selection biased in favour of children from relatively wealthy and influential families.33 In relation to the Primary Education Stipend Programme, for example, teachers have reported that the programme tools for identifying beneficiaries often lead local authorities to exclude poorer students and select those who are in a better position to meet the inclusion criteria.34 The problems associated with targeting and mismanagement raise important human rights concerns. 85. The conditionalities of the programme also raise human rights concerns. The emphasis on school performance and attendance may further exclude the poorest children; evidence in fact suggests that extremely poor children face greater challenges in meeting attainment and attendance criteria. Moreover, the conditionalities may create incentives to cheat on attendance figures and exam performance so that students can continue to receive their stipend. In such cases, the conditionality may be exposing children to the wrong lesson: that it is possible and acceptable to cheat the local authorities to have access to public resources.35 Conditionalities also raise gender-related concerns. The imposition that women be solely responsible for ensuring compliance may put an additional burden on women and expose them to abuse from those entrusted to monitor compliance with conditionalities. 86. Instead of implementing conditionalities, it might be more effective to invest in the quality of education. Higher quality education might encourage more students to attend and stay at school.36 The Government could, in addition, emphasize a curriculum that better prepares girls to participate in social, political and economic life. In particular, the Government should examine improving girls’ skills (such as financial management and agricultural techniques) that would increase their income-earning opportunities. 87. While the independent expert welcomes the efforts made to increase girls’ education, she calls on the Government to ensure that the education of boys living in extreme poverty is also properly addressed. This requires the Government to address the issue of child labour comprehensively. One of the most common reasons for children, and particularly boys, withdrawing from or failing to attend school is entry into paid work. 88. Lastly, the expert notes that the school stipend must be seen as one component of a wider social protection system. It can play a crucial role in raising school enrolment, but must be accompanied by efforts to ensure that the education offered is sufficient and of good quality. The stipend can only have an impact on children’s lives if it is fully integrated 31 32 33 34 35 36 GE.10-15451 World Bank, “Social safety nets in Bangladesh: an assessment”, 2006, p. 46. See for example Chronic Poverty Research Center, “School exclusion as social exclusion: the practices and effects of a conditional cash transfer programme for the poor in Bangladesh”, working paper No. 148, 2009, p. 19; and UNICEF, op. cit., p. 62. “Country experiences, benefits and challenges on female secondary school assistance project of Bangladesh”, Afzal Hossain, Ministry of Education, available on the website of the Asian Development Bank (www.adb.org). See Chronic Poverty Research Center, op. cit., p. 14. Ibid. See for example Schurmann, op. cit. 21