A/HRC/15/55* 114. Reports suggest that, in Bangladesh, targeting errors of different social assistance initiatives are extremely common, and the poorest of the poor are particularly affected. According to the World Bank, for example, 41 per cent of recipients of targeted programmes belong to the top three quintiles of the population, i.e. non-poor people.53 Given that the overall coverage of safety net programmes remains limited, inclusion errors in the programme are significant. 115. The independent expert is particularly concerned that, in several programmes, targeting criteria cannot be monitored, nor is anyone held accountable for the wrongful exclusion of groups in need from the programme. This raises serious concerns from a human rights perspective, as it means that discriminatory practices are unmonitored and often occur with impunity. 116. The sheer number of levels of decision-making involved in targeting processes increases the chances of arbitrary decisions. Moreover, when local leaders and administrators at the ward and district levels finally decide who will receive a benefit within their area of responsibility, the risk of reinforcing existing power structures increases, at the expense of the most vulnerable. 117. The independent expert notes that, while incorporating local notions of deprivation (e.g. through community targeting) has the potential of improving targeting criteria, there is a higher risk of error owing to the possibility of the programme being captured by local elites and that local preferences are not in favour of the extremely poor. The Government should review the targeting methods of its programmes so that they may be more easily monitored, in particular to ensure that the programmes reach the poorest of the poor. Special attention should also be paid to the issue of conditionalities. 4. Corruption and clientelism 118. Corruption appears to be a considerable obstacle to the supply of public services. For example, in one case, 22 per cent of students entitled to a stipend were reportedly forced to make unauthorized payments before collecting the stipend amount.54 Patron-client and favourable relationships with local elites connected to ward- and union-level elected representatives become crucial factors in access social benefits, in contravention to the principles of equality and non-discrimination. Corruption and clientelism allow political parties and governments to manipulate the provision of social services on a discriminatory basis, reinforcing exploitation patterns and the social exclusion of people that impede the exercise of their human rights. Corruption and clientelism mean that the poorest and most vulnerable lose out, while more powerful individuals maintain their position of power. 119. The independent expert welcomes the fact that the Government recognizes in its National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction II that corruption precludes development and has decided to address the culture of impunity. Corruption has the greatest impact on the poorest groups, since their access to complaint mechanisms is more limited and they are severely affected by any income reduction. In this context, the independent expert urges the Government to consider increasing support for mechanisms that ensure the accountability of those implementing social policies, and in particular, ensuring that complaint mechanisms are accessible to the poorest groups. 53 54 GE.10-15451 World Bank, Poverty Assessment for Bangladesh, op. cit., p. 41. Transparency International, “Integrity pledge: participatory governance through social accountability”, 2010, p. 3. 27