A/HRC/43/46 ideological or theological interventions, or what authorized thoughts or beliefs are has no place in societies governed by the rule of law and respect for human dignity. 34. The Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief has noted that neither an isolated focus on religion (which neglects the significance of human agency and political and other non-religious factors), nor a denial that religious motives could play a role in committing and supporting acts of violence (which might lead to inadequate responses from religious communities and their leaders) could fully explain the complex phenomenon of “violence committed in the name of religion”, which is sometimes associated with violent extremism.74 While narrow-minded interpretations of religions can play a role, religious texts can always accommodate different readings. Ultimately, individuals bear the responsibility for the practical consequences that they draw from the interpretation of their faith. 75 The Special Rapporteur recalls the complex factors contributing to and dovetailing with what is viewed as religious violence, including the loss of trust in public institutions caused by endemic corruption and cronyism, 76 policies of exclusion,77 as well as impunity, trivialization and legal impunity. 78 She affirms the broader analysis concerning the known factors conducive to terrorism and extremism and encourages States to use the resources they have to address deficits in governance, the rule of law and corruption; progress in that regard can be constructive and human rights compliant in combating terrorism and violent extremism. C. Preventing and countering violent extremism as a foreign policy tool 35. The Secretary-General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism links measures to prevent violent extremism with development, stressing that one means to address many of the drivers of violent extremism is to align national development policies with the Sustainable Development Goals. In practice, more and more of such work funded by Western States – aid, development, peacebuilding and technical assistance – has increasingly formed part of their security and counter-terrorism agendas, profoundly compromising the impartiality and neutrality of development and humanitarian actors on the ground. The co-opting and securitization of development agendas is short-sighted and distinctly counter-productive in the long-term. One such strategy 79 highlights as strategic objectives employing “foreign assistance tools and approaches, including development, to reduce specific political or social and economic factors that contribute to community support for violent extremism in identifiable areas or put particular segments of populations at high risk of violent extremist radicalization and recruitment to violence” and working with “partner organizations and multilateral institutions to enhance programmes that provide educational and social services in key countries with tools to address drivers of violent extremism”. Another80 states that “foreign policy makes a contribution towards addressing the causes of and conditions for violent extremism through its foreign policy engagement in [several] areas. Tackling its direct and structural causes requires long-term, sustainable commitment in transitional and fragile contexts, as well as in current conflict zones”. The Special Rapporteur stresses the necessity to stocktake in this critical policy area. 36. With aid budgets shrinking around the world, the prevention and countering of violent extremism has allowed Governments to link humanitarian and development aid to their broader security objectives. For recipient organizations, preventing and countering violent extremism has increased funding opportunities. However, as highlighted by many non-profit organizations and non-governmental organizations around the world, that approach is fundamentally at odds with principled humanitarian action. One non-governmental organization has taken the clear position that “approaches [to countering violent extremism] 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 A/HRC/28/66, para. 19. Ibid., paras. 22–25. Ibid., paras. 26–30. Ibid., paras. 30–35. Ibid., paras. 36–38. United States Department of State and USAID, joint strategy, p. 6. Switzerland, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, foreign policy action plan on preventing violent extremism, 2016. 13