A/HRC/43/51 reportedly been intimidated by being subjected to prolonged border controls, security checks and interrogations. Such realities, which are of ongoing concern, 46 seem to be gaining in intensity. United Nations experts and representatives, including mandate holders competent for monitoring certain country situations, have also been openly targeted, including by the officials of States currently members of the Human Rights Council. 41. The Declaration on Human Rights Defenders recalls defenders’ right to access and communicate with international human rights mechanisms. Gaps in self-recognition as defenders, lack of knowledge of these mechanisms and isolation from international networks certainly limit the capacity of defenders to communicate. Still, obstacles too often result from deliberate obstruction by States and non-State actors, including armed groups. A number of States and de facto authorities in control of specific areas or territories repeatedly deny access to United Nations special procedures, fact-finding missions and commissions of inquiry or other monitoring human rights institutions and effectively prevent defenders from engaging in-country, not only with such entities or mechanisms but also with diplomatic missions. 42. Defenders often experience reprisals after they have cooperated (or tried to cooperate) on human rights issues with United Nations entities, mechanisms and representatives, including during peace operations, with OHCHR field presences and with institutions such as the International Criminal Court and the World Bank. Such reprisals take the form of pre-emptive threats, travel bans, arbitrary detention, prosecution or threat thereof, ill-treatment and torture, and extrajudicial execution. Reprisals, when State-led, have sometimes extended beyond borders to Geneva and New York and to defenders’ countries of refuge, mobilizing intelligence and diplomatic services. These represent wider efforts to deny defenders’ right to defend human rights and expose violations. They continue to occur, despite the concerns expressed by the Special Rapporteur, the Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights and other United Nations institutions.47 V. Initiatives by States and civil society organizations and the response of the United Nations A. States and public institutions With other civil society organizations, we drafted a proposal for a law protecting defenders. It’s been before Parliament for a year now, but still hasn’t been looked at. (Defender, El Salvador) 43. Few conflict-affected States have adopted specific legislation, guidelines or protocols to protect defenders and secure their rights. Legislative processes in a number of States need to be fast-tracked to secure legislation or decrees essential for effective implementation. Whether adopted at the national or local level, such legislation must promote a broad and inclusive definition of defenders. 44. Protection units or mechanisms to protect defenders, where they exist, still need to deliver. Ongoing challenges include accessibility, trust within the community of defenders and reactivity, for instance to unlock funds and effectively relocate defenders. The ability to have an impact also depends on adequate responses by law enforcement and judicial institutions. The prospects of such institutions responding adequately remain limited, either because they are absent or because of corruption and collusion with organized crime. Protection measures must be designed with affected defenders and communities, to ensure their suitability and the coverage of specific needs. Most protection schemes currently available consist in short-term remedial actions with an individual focus, while preventive and collective ones may be more effective alternatives. The Special Rapporteur is concerned about reports of defenders placed under protection schemes who are then 46 47 A/58/380, para. 53; A/HRC/42/17, para. 72. A/HRC/42/30. 13