A/HRC/33/40 V. Investor-State dispute settlement, the investment court system and State sovereignty 43. Further research into the relationship between trade and human rights has led the Independent Expert to reverse his conditional endorsement of an international investment court (see A/HRC/30/44 and Corr.1, paras. 62 (i) and 66 (a); and A/70/285 and Corr.1, para. 55 (a)). Having re-evaluated the dangers, he considers the investment court system to be essentially a rebranding exercise. 44. In September 2015, European Union Commissioner for Trade, Cecilia Malmström, proposed replacing investor-State dispute settlement with an investor court system. Despite some improvements, including the introduction of an appeal mechanism and the appointment of judges, the investment court system fails to address the fundamental investor-State dispute settlement problems and aggravates the situation by multiplying the number of potential claims by a factor of 10,37 thus increasing the regulatory chill. The investment court system must be rejected for the following reasons: (a) The system is a one-way jurisdiction where investors can sue States, but not vice-versa. It is based on the arbitration model and is a pseudo-court lacking the fundamental safeguards to ensure an independent legal system, as found by the associations of German and Spanish judges; (b) The system does not impose obligations on investors, such as the “do no harm” principle, or compliance with environmental, social, labour, health or safety standards; (c) Foreign investors, unlike domestic investors and corporations, are privileged and allowed to circumvent domestic courts. There is no requirement to exhaust domestic remedies; (d) Expansive interpretations of the terms “investment”, “indirect expropriation”, “fair and equitable treatment” and “legitimate expectations” allow investors to sue States, even when the impugned legislation is in the public interest; (e) The burden of proof has been reversed, so that a State has to prove that its social legislation is “legitimate” and not “excessive”, thus inviting investors to litigate against precautionary measures and health and environmental legislation; (f) The chilling effect or regulatory freeze is intensified, so that States may not dare adopt social legislation for fear of being sued for millions of dollars; (g) The system does not grant standing to victims of investor action. 45. Under the proposed investment court system, the following pending investor-State dispute settlement cases could be filed, generating similar legal costs and billion dollar awards: (a) Philip Morris Brands Sàrl and others v. Uruguay, which was filed in 2010 and is still pending, in which the tobacco giant is suing Uruguay for implementing its obligations under the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control; 37 10 Natacha Cingotti and others, “Investment court system put to the test” (Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, Corporate Europe Observatory, Friends of the Earth Europe, Forum Umwelt und Entwicklung and the Transnational Institute, Amsterdam/Brussels/Berlin/Ottawa, 2016); Maude Barlow and Raoul Marc Jennar, “Le fléau de l’arbitrage international”, Le Monde diplomatique, February 2016. GE.16-11938