A/HRC/44/47/Add.2 establishment of democracy in Honduras following a coup d’état. In October 2015, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled that, as a result of its action in support of the coup d’état, the Supreme Court could not be regarded as possessing the objective requirement of impartiality to conduct the disciplinary proceedings against the four judges. It also concluded that the Judicial Career Council, the entity that reviewed the dismissal decisions issued by the Supreme Court pursuant to the Law on the Judicial Career, was not an autonomous and independent body by virtue of its nature as an auxiliary body dependent on the Supreme Court. 49. The most emblematic case of dismissal occurred on 12 December 2012, when four of the five judges of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court were dismissed by the National Congress. The reasoning behind their dismissal was the vote in favour of the application for amparo on the grounds of the unconstitutionality of Decree No. 89-2012, which created the Law to purge the police force of corruption. Allegedly, the dismissal was motivated by the fact that the conduct of the magistrates was contrary to the interests of the State and had the effect of endangering the security of citizens. Following the decision to dismiss the four judges, on the same day, the National Congress elected four new justices chosen from the list of candidates for Supreme Court magistrates compiled in 2009. 50. The Special Rapporteur reiterates that judges can only be dismissed for serious misconduct of a disciplinary or criminal nature that renders them unfit to discharge their duties, and solely in accordance with an objective and transparent procedure previously established under the Constitution or in legislation. The dismissal of judges and magistrates by other branches of government constitutes an egregious violation of the principles of judicial independence and the separation of powers and must be condemned without exception. 2. Selection and appointment of key actors in the justice system 51. A distinct threat to judicial independence and the separation of powers arises from the current procedures for the selection and appointment of magistrates of the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor-General and the Deputy Prosecutor-General, which do not provide sufficient guarantees to ensure their institutional independence, in particular from the legislative power. 52. Candidates for those positions must possess the qualifications listed in the Constitution. The Special Rapporteur is of the view that most of those requirements are too broad or generic, therefore in practice, candidates for the above-mentioned functions are currently selected solely on the basis of formal and overly general requirements that do not allow for a proper assessment of the moral integrity, independence and professional qualifications of the candidate. 53. The procedure for the selection and appointment of magistrates of the Supreme Court is set out in articles 309 to 315 of the Constitution and in the Organic Law on the Joint Nominating Committee for the Election of Candidates, and the selection and appointment of the Prosecutor-General and the Deputy Prosecutor-General is based on the Constitution and the Law on the Public Ministry. The procedures are similar; the appointment board prepares a list of candidates and transmits it to the National Congress, which appoints the candidates with the favourable vote of two thirds of its members. The composition of the appointment boards in charge of preparing the list of candidates is also similar and is designed to include various constituencies, such as judges, law practitioners, the National Commissioner for Human Rights, representatives of national universities and members of civil society, in the selection of candidates. 54. The Special Rapporteur is of the view that the current procedures do not offer sufficient guarantees to eliminate interference from political parties in the election of Supreme Court magistrates, the Prosecutor-General and the Deputy Prosecutor-General. Given the absence of clear and appropriate selection criteria and procedures for the assessment of candidates, coupled with the lack of transparency and public scrutiny, acts of patronage and political favours continue to be perpetrated in such a system, as shown by the most recent selection processes for the elections of magistrates of the Supreme Court, in 2016, and the Prosecutor-General and Deputy Prosecutor-General, in 2018. 55. In that regard, the Special Rapporteur wishes to stress that the involvement of the National Congress has had, in practice, the effect of politicizing judicial appointments, with 9