A/HRC/42/44/Add.1 96. Labour inspections play a pivotal role in preventing and responding to labour exploitation. The creation of the National Labour Inspectorate in 2017 was important for rationalizing inspections. However, labour inspections are often ineffective and nonstrategic for a number of reasons, including that inspectors have limited incentives to inspect farms, as they are badly remunerated and underresourced. Many labour inspectors have to use their own vehicles for inspections. Furthermore, the presence of criminal elements amongst employers and caporali exposes them to personal security risks and they therefore often prefer to avoid inspecting farms where the risk of exploitation is highest. As a result, compliant farms are often disproportionally inspected. In some regions, collusion between employers and labour inspectorates has been reported, leading to advance notification of inspections. That has enabled irregular workers and their employers to escape controls, perpetuating impunity. 97. In addition, there are often very few labour inspectors assigned to large geographic areas. In the province of Foggia, for example, 6 out of 31 inspectors are assigned to the agricultural sector, responsible for inspecting a total of 9,000 farms. There are also insufficient incentives to report exploitation due to a legislative framework introduced in 2009 which criminalizes “irregular entry and stay” and encourages labour inspectors to prioritize the detection of irregular migrant workers over monitoring working conditions. That needs to be reversed in order to increase the effectiveness of labour inspections. The Carabinieri Corps plays an important role in inspections owing to its valuable expertise and because it has the resources to detect and prosecute fraudulent and illegal practices. 98. Ensuring that migrant workers have access to decent housing can significantly improve their living conditions and reduce their precariousness, vulnerability to labour exploitation and exposure to organized crime. With some 35,000 empty and available houses in places like Gioia Tauro, alternatives to the informal settlements exist but they are currently not accessible to most migrant workers because of discrimination by locals and because there is no adequate rental system or public transportation to take them to the fields, even if they are allowed to occupy the houses. That creates a vicious cycle which could be stopped with adequate public policies and awareness-raising in the local communities. 99. Instead of decreasing the vulnerability to exploitation and abuse of migrants, it seems likely that Law No. 132/2018 will exacerbate the situation. Among the other implications mentioned above, it reportedly bars asylum seekers from registering at municipal registry offices, which may lead to their exclusion from various health and social services and rights.26 Access to justice and right to an effective remedy 100. Despite the prohibition of slavery as a criminal offence, prosecutions remain exceptional at the national level, particularly as regards the conviction of employers. In 2016, 10 criminal trials began that had not yet been finalized at the time of the Special Rapporteur’s visit. There are multiple barriers to the effective investigation and prosecution of slavery in the agrifood sector, such as impediments to gaining access to victims in the fields and to their testimonies. In particular, irregular migrant workers are deterred from exposing human rights violations for fear of being arrested or deported. That affects the identification of victims and confirms the invisible nature of slavery. Prosecuting the caporali alone is not enough if structural gaps are not adequately addressed. 101. Law No. 199/2016 established that victims of labour exploitation could be granted access to article 18 of the Consolidated Act on Immigration, providing victims of violence or severe exploitation with long-term assistance and social integration measures, as well as with a residence permit for social protection in the case of non-European Union migrants, regardless of their cooperation with the judicial authorities. 27 Nevertheless, shortcomings in 26 27 See Open Society European Policy Institute, “Is Italian agriculture a ‘pull factor’ for irregular migration – and, if so, why?”, p. 20. See Letizia Palumbo, “Trafficking and labour exploitation in domestic work and the agricultural sector in Italy”, European University Institute (June 2016). 15