A/HRC/19/61 53. Commissions of inquiry are able to complement the prosecutorial function 37 as they may make use of information not admissible in a court of law because the evidentiary standards are less rigorous. For example, in commissions of inquiry, hearsay evidence is generally admissible owing to the lower evidentiary standards required. Similarly, often the required burden of proof is not as high as it would be in criminal trials; for example, a preponderance of the evidence may be sufficient, as opposed to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in the case of commissions of inquiry, individuals are typically invited voluntarily to testify or submit written statements, unlike the more formal deposition proceedings generally required in traditional courts of law. 38 54. Commissions of inquiry can also directly assist prosecutions by providing information collected by the commission to the prosecuting authorities. Information derived from a commission’s final report can serve as a useful, even if not entirely comprehensive, tool in the formal prosecution of a victim’s case. For example, the commission’s findings may provide insights into the role and extent of the complicity of State officials in torture. In all instances where a commission of inquiry receives allegations of torture and other forms of ill-treatment committed by State or non-State actors, the allegation and all relevant evidence must be submitted to relevant prosecutorial authorities for the initiation of a formal legal investigation and, if relevant, prosecution. 55. If a commission of inquiry precedes formal criminal prosecutions, or the two mechanisms exist simultaneously, care must be taken to ensure that the work of the commission does not inhibit prosecutions in any way. 39 In establishing an international commission of inquiry to investigate the assassination of former Prime Minister of Pakistan Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto, the Secretary-General agreed that the international commission should be fact-finding in nature and not be a criminal investigation; the duty of carrying out a criminal investigation, finding the perpetrators and bringing them to justice, remains with the competent Pakistani authorities.40 56. Additionally, a commission of inquiry cannot give effect to an amnesty law or decree, because amnesties that “prevent prosecution of individuals who may be legally responsible for war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and other gross violations of human rights are inconsistent with States’ obligations under various sources of international law as well as with United Nations policy.” 41 IV. Identifying best practices and establishing standards for commissions of inquiry 57. The wealth of experience in national and international commissions of inquiry is a source of multiple lessons on both good and bad practices. The Istanbul Protocol and the Principles to Combat Impunity provide examples of standard-setting that apply to the institution, objectives, working methods and outcomes of commissions of inquiry. Given the wide variety of contexts and purposes for which commissions of inquiry are created, 37 38 39 40 41 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone coexisted with the Special Court for Sierra Leone, set up jointly by the Government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations, which had a responsibility to try those with the greatest responsibility for international crimes during the conflict. See OHCHR, “Rule of Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Prosecutorial Initiatives”, New York and Geneva, 2006, p. 33. See E/CN.4/2003/68, para. 26 (k). See the report of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry into the facts and circumstances of the assassination of the former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto (available from www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Pakistan/UN_Bhutto_Report_15April2010.pdf), p. v. See OHCHR, “Rule of Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Amnesties”, chap. V. 15