A/HRC/45/32 47. The impact of such statements was limited because they were late in coming and were in contradiction with earlier instructions. On 15 January 2020, the permanent secretary of the National Security Council had mentioned the need to revitalize the joint committees and to “control population flows and movements of travellers and to keep track every day of the foreigners staying in every household and at every hotel”. 48. Part of the population continued to be forced by the Imbonerakure and local officials to make contributions in cash or in kind, including to support the CNDD-FDD party, to organize political rallies or to give gifts to the party’s candidates. 49. Some people were prevented from participating in rallies organized by the CNL, in particular owing to a lack of transport, while others were forced to participate in those organized by the CNDD-FDD party, as markets were closed down for the occasion. Some voters had no choice but to vote for the ruling party in the various elections because they could not vote in private or they were subjected to intimidation. 50. Children were forced to participate in political meetings organized by the CNDDFDD party, as their classes were suspended. School principals threatened to lower students’ grades for the subject entitled “education” if they failed to take part. On election day, students, including minors, were forced to vote by local officials or school principals, who gave them the voting cards of deceased or exiled voters. 51. The electoral process took place at a time when the Burundian authorities were underestimating the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic and even made use of the pandemic for electoral purposes. The authorities insisted on organizing the elections without taking adequate measures to protect the population. They encouraged people to participate in massive CNDD-FDD electoral rallies and refused to communicate transparently about the extent of the pandemic or the risks involved. They even threatened to punish those who took early protective measures. Sick people were afraid to go for treatment or screening. Such action violated the right to health, and even the right to life. 4. Women in the electoral process 52. In 2020, 52 per cent of Burundian voters are women. The Constitution provides for a 30 per cent gender quota system, which has been implemented under the Electoral Code through a co-opting mechanism and blocked lists. Burundi ranks among the countries in Africa 14 with the highest rate of women elected to national and decentralized office, for example with 39 per cent of the National Assembly and 41 per cent of the Senate. In accordance with the constitutional quota, 5 of the 15 ministers in President Ndayishimiye’s Government are women. However, on average, only 12 to 18 per cent of those appointed or elected to institutions without gender quotas, such as provincial governorships or hill district councils, have been women. This shows the importance of special measures to accelerate the achievement of de facto equality between men and women in the country. 53. In the context of the electoral process, women members of opposition parties were victims of arbitrary arrest and detention, but also of intimidation and threats, particularly when the electoral lists were published. Such actions were aimed at discouraging them from actively participating in the electoral process or at blocking them from exercising their civil liberties. 54. The electoral violence experienced by women is different from that affecting men. It is inherently sexist15 and is also linked to the preservation of traditional gender roles and structural gender inequalities.16 Burundian women who engage in politics face multiple forms of discrimination, as there is a perception that political activity is difficult to reconcile with their roles as wives and mothers. Such prejudices, all of which block women from exercising their fundamental freedoms, exist both in the private sphere and in the political parties. The 14 15 16 10 See Economic Commission for Africa, Women in decision-making spheres in Africa, fact sheet, June 2019. A/73/301, para. 33. Ibid., para. 13. GE.20-10689