A/HRC/36/52 primary responsibility in preventing such crimes against humanity and divert illicit financial flows from their countries. 73. In their ostensible competition for foreign investment, speculative financial flows and/or individual wealth, poor countries are increasingly pitted against each other in needless “tax wars” that do little more than eventually shrink almost all of their tax bases, distort markets and lead to a regulatory race to the bottom. 88 Greater international cooperation can allow poor countries to resist the temptation to institute such “beggar-thyneighbour” policies and maintain a common minimum standard to protect all of their respective markets and tax bases. 74. In order to prevent illicit financial flows, all stakeholders need to be equally committed to both South-South and North-South cooperation. The necessity of North-South cooperation stems from the fact that the final destinations of almost all illicit financial flows are either rich Western countries or their satellites. 89 This point is picked up by the Independent Expert in his final study, in which he noted that “many of the world’s most important secrecy jurisdictions are developed countries, which have historically been overlooked in their role in facilitating tax evasion” and illicit financial flows (see A/HRC/31/61, para. 9). Further, in a 2014 report, OECD noted that “without action, OECD countries are at risk of becoming safe havens for illicit assets from developing countries”.90 Unless secrecy jurisdictions and destination countries commit to doing all that they can to prevent illicit financial flows landing on their shores, the “safe haven” charge is likely to stick. 75. South-South cooperation is also critical as it will, first, arrest regional beggar-thyneighbour taxation and anti-corruption policies by enhancing cooperation, presenting a common front and reducing harmful competition. Second, this kind of cooperation could conceivably lead to the formation of regional economic blocs focused on this issue that would tend to strengthen the negotiating positions of the poorer countries vis-à-vis the relevant multinational corporations and their countries of origin. 91 This will address the fundamental imbalance of wealth and power between these actors. X. Conclusions and recommendations 76. Without effective repatriation of the stolen assets, developing countries and countries in transition to democracy are deprived of very much needed resources, and the opportunity to take advantage of the momentum for undertaking the economic and social reforms necessary for bolstering development, is being missed. The delaying tactics of Governments and banks as well as attempts to justify hindrances to the effective return of illicit financial flows are not only reproachable from a moral point of view but also politically and economically unacceptable. 77. The fact that the countries that struggled for democracy during the Arab Spring had not been able to recover the money looted by their former dictators is scandalous. Stolen assets must be effectively returned not only because those resources are urgently needed, but also because of their highly symbolic value. The international community must urgently send a strong message: corruption promoted by the highest levels of the State cannot be tolerated and will not go unpunished. 78. States must cooperate in good faith to facilitate the repatriation of illicit financial flows. They must enact proactive legislation and promote policies and practices aimed at facilitating the smooth and prompt return of the assets to the 88 89 90 91 18 Shaxson and Christensen, “Tax competitiveness”. OECD reports on illicit financial flows; J. Henry, “How to respond to the Panama Papers”, Foreign Affairs (April 2016), available at www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/panama/2016-04-12/taxing-taxhavens; and Shaxson and Christensen, “Tax competitiveness”. OECD, Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries, p. 3 Krishen Mehta and Erika Dayle Sui, “Ten ways developing countries can take control of their own tax destinies”, in Pogge and Mehta, Global Tax Fairness, p. 353.