A/HRC/40/43 proportionality and precaution have been effectively respected throughout the military operations under review. Instead, the latest update confirms earlier concerns expressed by the Secretary-General and the High Commissioner as to the failure of the Military Advocate General and the Attorney General to consistently open criminal investigations in cases where there is prima facie evidence that State agents have committed unlawful actions. 12 9. In the 31 cases where criminal investigations were launched by the Military Advocate General, most were closed on the grounds that the attacks complied with Israeli domestic law and international law. This was the reason given, for example, for closing the investigation into the incident in which strikes by Israeli security forces killed four boys, aged 10 and 11, from the Bakr family, who were playing on a beach in Gaza on 16 July 2014.13 Information gathered by OHCHR and the independent commission of inquiry raises serious concerns as to whether fundamental principles of international humanitarian law were respected in this case.14 An appeal against the Military Advocate General’s decision to close the investigation, submitted in August 2015 by Adalah: The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, Al Mezan and the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights on behalf of the families, is still pending.15 This case, featuring many eyewitnesses, also raises serious concerns about the ability of the internal investigation mechanism of the Military Advocate General to ensure accountability and provide an effective remedy for victims. The fact that the Military Advocate General provided legal advice to the military before and during the fighting further suggests an inherent conflict of interests faced by the Military Advocate General in his investigative role and calls into question his ability to ensure genuine accountability. The High Commissioner had previously expressed concerns with regard to the independence, impartiality, promptness and transparency of the Office of the Military Advocate General.16 10. On 14 March 2018, the Israeli State Comptroller, in his capacity as the Ombudsman, published a fourth report on the 2014 escalation of hostilities. 17 In the report, the State Comptroller suggests that international law was taken into account within the scope of the activities of the Israel Defense Forces in Gaza, and that the civilian population received assistance during the hostilities. However, he did not examine the policies and rules of engagement applicable to the conduct of hostilities, including the implementation thereof, that resulted in the killing of almost 1,500 civilians. 18 11. In the report, the State Comptroller further provides an assessment of the General Staff Mechanism for Fact Finding Assessments, to which 220 out of 360 incidents that occurred during the 2014 escalation of hostilities in Gaza were referred for initial factual examination. He concluded that the mechanism was in line with requirements under international law, despite acknowledging its subordination to the Chief of General Staff of the Israel Defense Forces, as well as various gaps and flaws in its work. Those deficiencies included the failure to separate the mechanism from the general staff operational debriefing team, insufficient training for the teams and lack of legal expertise, independence, effectiveness and impartiality.19 Given the structural and operational issues identified, it is 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 4 A/HRC/37/41, para. 14, A/HRC/35/19, para. 18, and A/71/364, para. 40. In this case, the Military Advocate General found the following: “The professional discretion exercised by all the commanders involved in the incident had not been unreasonable under the circumstances. However, it became clear after the fact that the identification of the figures as militants from Hamas’s Naval Forces was in error. Nonetheless, the tragic outcome of the incident does not affect the legality of the attack ex post facto.” (See www.idf.il/en/minisites/wars-and-operations/magcorps-press-release-update-4-june-2015/.) A/HRC/37/41, para. 12, A/HRC/28/80/Add.1, para. 36, and A/HRC/29/CRP.4, paras. 631–633. The decision of 11 November 2018 of the District Court of Beersheba in the Nabaheen case (see para. 25 below) is expected to have a direct influence on the outcome of this case. A/HRC/37/41, para. 11. See www.mevaker.gov.il/he/Reports/Report_622/3cdfbe36-04fc-4ff2-b2df-33ce258ae838/dablaeng.pdf. See www.ochaopt.org/content/key-figures-2014-hostilities; and A/HRC/29/CRP.4. Operation “Protective Edge” IDF Activity from the Perspective of International Law, Particularly with Regard to Mechanisms of Examination and Oversight of Civilian and Military Echelons, table 1,