A/HRC/29/52 (b) Destruction 53. Information gathered by the commission, including from witness accounts, United Nations reports, video and photographic materials, observations by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNITAR-UNOSAT)40 and anecdotal testimonies by soldiers of the Israel Defense Forces, indicates that destruction by artillery fire, air strikes and bulldozers may have been adopted as a tactic of war. Some destruction may arguably be the result of the legitimate attempts of the Israel Defense Forces to dismantle tunnels and to protect its soldiers. The concentration of destruction in localities close to the Green Line, in some areas amounting to 100 per cent, and the systematic way in which these areas were flattened one after the other, however, raise concerns that such extensive destruction was not required by imperative military necessity.41 If confirmed, this would constitute a grave breach of article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which is a war crime. (c) Warnings and the continued protected status of civilians 54. In many cases during the ground operations, the Israel Defense Forces warned the population of impending attacks by means of leaflets, loudspeaker announcements, telephone calls, text messages and radio announcements. 42 In many instances, however, inhabitants did not leave their homes. 43 For instance, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported on 20 July that the majority of the 92,000 inhabitants of Shuja’iya had remained in their neighbourhood despite repeated warnings to evacuate. 44 Witnesses pointed to several reasons for staying, including not knowing in which direction to go, given that intense shelling and air strikes were under way in many parts of Gaza; lack of clarity of and unclear time frames indicated by the warnings; the fact that many places considered safe were already overcrowded; and the poor conditions in shelters, which themselves came under attack. 55. Statements by officials of the Israel Defense Forces indicated that, in some cases, warnings to evacuate were meant to create “sterile combat zones”, and the people remaining in the area would no longer be considered civilians and thus benefit from the protection afforded by their civilian status. For example, the Head of the Doctrine Desk at the Infantry Corps Headquarters, Major Amitai Karanik, reportedly stated: “We try to create a situation whereby the area where we are fighting is sterile, so any person seen there is suspected of engaging in terrorist activity. At the same time, we make the utmost effort to remove the population, whether this means dropping flyers or shelling [.] We don’t want to confuse the troops […] In peacetime security, soldiers stand facing a civilian population, but in wartime, there is no civilian population, just an enemy.”45 The commission is aware of the assertions made by the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs that “although Hamas authorities actively encouraged civilians to ignore the IDF’s warnings and refrain from evacuating, the IDF did not regard civilians who heeded such advice as voluntary human shields and thus legitimate targets for attack. Nor did the IDF discount such civilians for purposes of its proportionality analyses.” 46 It is the view articulated by Major Karanik that appears, however, to have prevailed in at least two of the neighbourhoods examined by the 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 UNITAR, Impact of the 2014 Conflict in the Gaza Strip (see footnote 20), p. 8. Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention IV of 1907, art. 23; Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 53. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, IDF Conduct of Operations (see footnote 17), pp. 30–37. Ibid. OCHA, Gaza Emergency Situation Report (see footnote 8), p. 2. Bayabasha, Ground Forces Magazine, October 2014, No. 29, p. 62 (unofficial translation). Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, IDF Conduct of Operations (see footnote 17), p. 13. 13