A/HRC/13/42* page 130 ineffective. In some States, protracted states of emergency and broadly defined conflicts against vaguely conceived enemies have tended to turn exceptional, temporary rules into the norm. 2. Intelligence agencies 286. In many contexts, intelligence agencies operate in a legal vacuum with no law, or no publicly available law, governing their actions. Although intelligence bodies are not authorized by legislation to detain persons, they do so many times, sometimes for prolonged periods. In such situations, there are either no oversight and accountability mechanisms at all, or they are severely restricted, with limited powers, and hence ineffective. 3. International cooperation 287. From operation Condor in South America through to the global CIA network, secret detention has relied on systems of trans-border (regional or global) cooperation. This means that, in many instances, foreign security forces may operate freely in the territory of other States. It also leads to the mutual exchange of intelligence information between States, followed by its use for the purpose of detaining or trying the person before tribunals, the proceedings of which do not comply with international norms, often with reference to State secrets, making it impossible to verify how the information was obtained.490 A crucial element in international cooperation, be it in the methods of operation Condor of the 1970s or the current policies of “extraordinary rendition”, is the transfer of alleged terrorists to other countries, where they may face a substantial risk of being subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment in contravention of the principle of non-refoulement. Worse, in some cases, persons have been rendered to other countries precisely to circumvent the prohibition of torture and “rough” treatment. Practices such as “hosting” secret detention sites or providing proxy detention have, however, been supplemented by numerous other facets of complicity, including authorizing the landing of airplanes for refuelling, short-term deprivation of liberty before handing over the “suspect”, the covering up of kidnappings, and so on. With very few exceptions, too little has been done to investigate allegations of complicity. 288. While the experts welcome the cooperation extended by a number of States, including through the responses submitted by 44 of them to the questionnaire, they express their regret that, although States have the obligation to investigate secret detention, many did not send responses, and a majority of those received did not contain sufficient information. A lack of access to States’ territories also meant that a number of interviews had to be conducted by telephone or Skype, with those interviewed fearing being monitored. 490 A/61/259, paras. 44-65.